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"An importantconsiderationin imposing penalties is to providefairness to
uninvolved student-athletes, coaches, administrators,competitors and
other institutions.

INTRODUCTION

The players who committed the violations are gone. The coach at the
time the violations occurred is gone. The director of intercollegiate athletics at the time the violations occurred is gone. On May 8, 2003, the National Collegiate Athletics Association (NCAA) imposed sanctions on the
University of Michigan men's basketball team for amateurism and recruiting violations occurring from the spring of 1992 through the spring of
1999.2 The problem is that the NCAA imposed sanctions on innocent student-athletes, coaches, and administrators who were not affiliated with the
university when the violations were committed.3 Therefore, the current
student-athletes, coaches, and administrators were unduly burdened with
sanctions, such as a ban on postseason competition, probation, the loss of a
student-athlete scholarship from 2004-2008, and censure, among others,
because of the violations committed by past student-athletes and coaches.4
While the student-athletes, coaches, and administrators who committed the

1. NCAA BYLAW, art. 19.01.1, reprinted in NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N,
2003-2004 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL 333 (2003) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL].
2.
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT, May 8, 2003, at §
II.A., available at http://www.ncaa.org/releases/infractions/2003050801in.htm [hereinafter
MICHIGAN REPORT].

From the spring of 1992 and continuing through the spring of 1999, the
athletics representative provided recruiting inducements and extra benefits in the form of cash, clothing, jewelry, transportation, lodging, meals
and other like benefits totaling approximately $616,000 in value to at
least four then student-athletes and members of their families and at
least one other unnamed former student athlete.

Id. at § II.
3.
See, e.g., University of Michigan Athletics, 1998-99 Michigan Men's Basketball Roster, at http://mgoblue.com/roster.cfm?section-id=230&level=3&top=2&season=58
(last visited Feb. 7, 2005); University of Michigan Athletics, 2002-2003 Michigan Men's
Basketball Roster,at
http://mgoblue.com/roster.cfm?section id=230&level=3&top=2&season=30 (last visited
Feb. 7, 2005); University of Michigan Athletics, 2003-2004 Men's Basketball Coaching
Staff, at http://mgoblue.com/document display.cfm?documentid=11962 (last visited Feb.
7, 2005); University of Michigan Athletics, Directorof IntercollegiateAthletics, at
http://www.mgoblue.com/document-display.cfm?documentid=3065 (last visited Feb. 7,

2005).

4.

MICHIGAN REPORT,

supra note 2, at § III.
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violations moved on either through graduation or other career opportunities, the present players are left behind to pay the price for those who came
before them.
The NCAA is a "voluntary" organization consisting of 1265 public
and private member institutions and conferences. 5 The University of
Michigan is affiliated with Division I of the NCAA, which is comprised of
325 member institutions. 6 More than 355,000 student-athletes form the
basis and backbone of the NCAA and its member institutions. 7 The organization "is a membership-led association of colleges and universities
with athletics programs committed to: [pirotecting the best interests of
student-athletes; ...[e]nsuring a quality education for student-athletes;...
[and] [slupporting athletics participation opportunities for studentathletes."8 The basic purpose of the NCAA is "to maintain intercollegiate
athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an
integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports." 9
The NCAA is governed by a comprehensive 482 page manual consisting of the NCAA Division I constitution, operating bylaws, and administrative bylaws which have been adopted by the member institutions and specify the rules by which the organizations are to operate. 10 It is the responsibility of each member institution to ensure that the principle of "institutional control" is upheld, and that all student-athletes and employees of the
institution comply with the constitution and bylaws of the NCAA. 11
"Member institutions shall be obligated to apply and enforce this legisla-

5.

2003 NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION GENERAL INFORMATION

BROCHURE 10, available at
("There
http://www.ncaa.org/library/general/general-brochure/2003/2003-gen-info.pdf
currently are 1,006 active members (325 in Division I, 270 in Division II and 411 in Division III) and 130 conference members. There are 28 provisional members, 80 affiliated
members and 21 corresponding members.") [hereinafter GENERAL INFORMATION
BROCHURE].
6.
GENERAL INFORMATION BROCHURE,

supra note 5, at 10 (There are three membership divisions in the NCAA-Division I, Division II, and Division III. Member institutions determine which division is the most appropriate by "sports sponsorship minimum
criteria, football and basketball scheduling requirements, academic and eligibility standards,
and financial aid limitations.").
GENERAL INFORMATION BROCHURE, supra note 5, at 9.
7.
8.

9.
10.
11.

GENERAL INFORMATION BROCHURE, supra note 5, at 3-5.

NCAA CONST., art. 1.3.1, reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at 1.
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at iii-viii.
NCAA CONST., art. 1.2(b), reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at 1.
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tion, and the enforcement procedures of the Association
shall be applied to
'2
an institution when it fails-to fulfill this obligation."'
Article 19 of the NCAA bylaws 3 outlines the NCAA enforcement
procedures. The mission of the NCAA enforcement program is to "eliminate violations of NCAA rules and impose appropriate penalties should
violations occur."' 14 Member institutions are required to "cooperate fully"
with the enforcement staff "to further the objectives of the Association and
its enforcement program."' 15 In order to enforce the rules, the NCAA created the Committee on Infractions (COI), which is responsible for interpreting the rules and imposing sanctions upon member institutions which violate the rules. 16 The ten-person COI is responsible for providing guidance
to the investigative staff and assessing the factual findings made by the
staff so an appropriate penalty can be imposed for any violations commit17
ted.

If a member institution appeals the findings of fact or penalty imposed
for a major violation determined by the COI, the Infractions Appeals

12.
NCAA CONST., art. 1.3.2, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at I
(emphasis added).
13.
NCAA BYLAW, art. 19, reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at 333-41.
14.
NCAA BYLAW, art. 19.01.1, reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at 333.
15.
NCAA BYLAW, art. 19.01.3, reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at 333.
16.
Richard R. Hilliard, Angel F. Shelton, & Kevin E. Pearson, An Update on Recent Decisions Rendered by the NCAA Infractions Appeals Committee: FurtherGuidance
for NCAA Member Institutions, 28 J.C. & U.L. 605, 606 (2002) [hereinafter Hilliard]. See
also NCAA BYLAW, art. 19.1, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at 334-35. There
are five articulated duties of the Committee on Infractions:
a) Consider complaints that may be filed with the Association charging
the failure of any member to maintain the academic or athletics standards required for membership or the failure of any member to meet the
conditions and obligations of membership in the Association; b) Formulate and revise, in accordance with the requirements of Bylaw 19.3, a
statement of its established operating policies and procedures, including
investigative guidelines; c) Determine facts related to alleged violations
and find violations of NCAA rules and requirements; d) Impose an appropriate penalty or show-cause requirement on a member found to be
involved in a major violation (or, upon appeal, on a member found to be
involved in a secondary violation), or recommend to the Board of Directors suspension or termination of membership; and e) Carry out any
other duties directly related to the administration of the Association's
enforcement program.
NCAA BYLAW, art. 19.1.3, reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at 335.
17.
NCAA BYLAW, art. 19.1.1 & 19.1.3, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note
1, at 334. See also John P. Sahl, College Athletes and Due Process Protection: What's Left
After National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian __ U.S. _ 109 S. Ct. 454
(1988), 21 ARIz. ST. L.J. 621, 630 (1989).
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Committee (IAC) will conduct an appeals hearing upon a written notice by
the member institution.' 8 The five-member IAC will set aside a penalty
imposed by the COI if the penalty is "excessive or inappropriate based on
all the evidence and circumstances."' 9 Findings of fact or penalty will not
be set aside except upon a showing that: 1) The COI finding is clearly contrary to the evidence presented; 2) The facts found by the COI do not constitute a rules violation; or 3) A procedural error affected the reliability of
the information that was utilized to support the finding. 20 Following the
determinations of fact and violations by 22the IAC, the decision is considered
final 21 and not subject to further review.
The purpose of this article is to determine whether innocent studentathletes, coaches, and administrators are afforded adequate due process
protection when penalties are imposed upon the member institution for
violations that occurred in past years. Although NCAA bylaw 19.01.1
claims that "an important consideration in imposing penalties is to provide
fairness to uninvolved student-athletes, coaches, administrators, and other
institutions,, 23 this author contends that the NCAA is not doing enough to
protect these innocent participants in the NCAA. Innocent student-athletes,
coaches, and administrators should not have to suffer through longstanding and severe sanctions because of the actions of past studentathletes, coaches, and administrators no longer associated with the member
institution.
This article is divided into three principal parts. Part I will address the
history of the state-action doctrine with regards to the NCAA. Contrary to
the United States Supreme Court's holding in National CollegiateAthletic

18.

NCAA BYLAW, art. 32.10.1, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at 447.

19.
NCAA BYLAW, art. 32.10.2, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at 447.
Seven factors are to be utilized to determine whether a penalty is "excessive or inappropriate":
1) The nature, number and seriousness of the violations; 2) The conduct
and motives of the individuals involved in the violations; 3) The corrective actions taken by the university; 4) The comparison of the penalty or
penalties imposed in other cases with similar characteristics; 5) The university's cooperation in the investigation; 6) The impact of penalties on
innocent student-athletes and coaches; and 7) The NCAA policies regarding fairness in and equitable resolution of infractions cases.
Hilliard, supra note 16, at 608. See also Infractions Case Appeal: University of Mississippi, NCAA REGISTER, May 1, 1995 at § VI.B. [hereinafter Mississippi APPEALS REPORT].
NCAA BYLAW, art. 32.10.2, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at 447.
20.
NCAA BYLAW, art. 32.11.4, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at 448.
21.
NCAA BYLAW, art. 32.11.5, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at 448.
22.
NCAA BYLAW, art. 19.01.1, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at 333.
23.
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Association v. Tarkanian,24 this author contends that the NCAA is a state
actor when imposing sanctions upon member institutions, and therefore
innocent student-athletes, coaches and administrators are entitled to judicial
intervention when improperly burdened with sanctions. Part 11 will address
the sanctions imposed upon the University of Michigan basketball program
by the university itself and the NCAA. This author will argue that the
sanctions imposed upon the University of Michigan by the NCAA constituted state action, and innocent student-athletes and coaches should be able
to seek judicial intervention to argue a deprivation of a liberty or property
interest. Part III will address possible reforms that can be implemented by
the NCAA to make the enforcement procedures more equitable so that the
innocent participants are not burdened by sanctions imposed due to the acts
of others.
I.

A.

NCAA AND THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE

NCAA AND THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE PRIOR TO 1982

The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution pro-

vides that "[n]o state shall ...

deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-

erty without due process of law., 25 "[Tihe principle has become firmly
embedded in our constitutional law that the action inhibited by the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be
said to be that of the States. 26 The Fourteenth Amendment, however,
"erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or
wrongful. 27 If an action is deemed to be private, then the claimant does
not have a cause of action under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.2 8
A claim raised by a student-athlete, coach, or administrator under the
Fourteenth Amendment against the NCAA will be made pursuant to the
state action doctrine contained in 42 U.S.C § 1983.29 42 U.S.C. § 1983
provides:

24.
25.
26.
27.

28.
29.

488 U.S. 179 (1988).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982).

Id.
Sahl, supra note 17, at 622.
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If a person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any state or territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities, secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.3 °
The requirements that the action be "under color" of law pursuant to §
1983 and the "state action" requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment
have been treated the same and are used "interchangeably" in determining
whether a due process violation occurred.3 1
Prior to 1982, federal courts almost unanimously held the NCAA to be
a state actor under § 1983 when the NCAA imposed sanctions upon member institutions. 32 Although these cases are no longer controlling due to the
1988 United States Supreme Court decision in National CollegiateAthletic
Association v. Tarkanian,33 "the cases contain persuasive arguments for
upholding the NCAA's status as a state actor." 34 Two of the leading cases
holding the NCAA to be a state actor prior to 1982 are Parish v. National
35 and Howard University v. National ColleCollegiateAthletic Association
36
giate Athletic Association.
Parishand Howard are demonstrative of the two leading theories that
student-athletes used to characterize the NCAA as a state actor when the
NCAA or member institution attempted to deprive them of eligibility: the
public function theory and the nexus, or entanglement, doctrine. Under the

30.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003).
Howard Univ. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 510 F.2d 213, 217 n.4 (D.C.
31.
Cir. 1975).
See, e.g., id.; Hennessey v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th
32.
Cir. 1977); Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 560 F.2d 352 (8th
Cir. 1977); Parish v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975); Wright
v. Arkansas Activities Ass'n, 501 F.2d 25 (8th Cir. 1974); Mitchell v. Louisiana High Sch.
Athletic Ass'n, 430 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1970); Jones v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 392
F.Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975); Buckton v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 366 F.Supp. 1152
(D. Mass. 1973). But see McDonald v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 370 F.Supp. 625
(C.D. Cal. 1974) (holding the NCAA not to be a state actor).
33.
488 U.S. 179 (1988).
34.
Michael G. Dawson, National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian:
Supreme Court Upholds NCAA's Private Status Under the Fourteenth Amendment, Repelling Shark's Attack on NCAA 's DisciplinaryPowers, 17 PEPP. L. REv. 217, 227-28 (1989).
35.
506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975).
510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
36.

NORTHERN IWlNOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 25

public function theory, when a private entity is entrusted with traditional
state functions, the entity becomes a state actor and is therefore subject to
the same Fourteenth Amendment due process limitations as the state.37
Under the entanglement or nexus approach, "conduct that is formally 'private' may become so entwined with governmental policies or so impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon state action, 3 8 thus transforming the private
conduct into state action, subject to the same Fourteenth Amendment due
process limitations as the state.
In Parish,five college basketball players for Centenary College challenged the NCAA 1.600 rule. The 1.600 rule required member institutions
to grant scholarships and eligibility only to student-athletes who could be
predicted to achieve a 1.600 minimum grade point average during their first
year in college based on the athlete's high school grade point average or
class rank and the score received on one of two standardized achievement
exams. 39 The student-athletes were admitted to the university on athletic
scholarships, and the NCAA applied sanctions against Centenary for violating the 1.600 rule. 4° The student-athletes requested the court to issue a
permanent injunction, preventing the NCAA from enforcing the sanctions
imposed upon Centenary, and ultimately themselves, for violating the
1.600 rule.4 1
The court in Parish relied upon both the public function test and entanglement doctrine in holding the NCAA to be a state actor in this case.
With regards to the public function test, Justice Thornberry stated for the
majority:
Organized athletics play a large role in higher education,
and... meaningful regulation of this aspect of education is
now beyond the effective reach of any one state. In a real
sense, then, the NCAA by taking upon itself the role of co-

37.
See, e.g., Sahl, supra note 17, at 642-43; Susan Westover, National Collegiate
Athletic Association v. Tarkanian: If NCAA Action is Not State Action, Can Its Members
Meaningfully Air Their Dissatisfaction?,26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 953, 956 (1989); Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946).
38.
Buckton, 366 F.Supp. at 1156 (citing Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299

(1966)) ("B.U. (Boston University), though a private institution, clearly performs functions

governmental in nature, such as providing higher education to and exercising substantial
dominion over its students. It may be constrained, therefore, by the requirements of the

Constitution.").
39. Parish,506 F.2d at 1030.
40. !d. at 1030-31.
41.
Id. at 1031.
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ordinator and overseer of college athletics-in the interest
both of the individual student and of the institution he attends-is performing a traditional governmental function.42
Although the court recognized that no single state and/or governmental body directs the NCAA, the court reasoned, "it would be strange doctrine indeed to hold that the states could avoid the restrictions placed upon
them by the Constitution by banding together to form or to support a 'private' organization to which they have relinquished some portion of their
governmental power.' 43
Justice Thornberry in Parishalso relied in part upon the entanglement
doctrine in finding the NCAA to be a state actor. Justice Thornberry stated
that "state-supported educational institutions and their members and officers play a substantial, although admittedly not pervasive, role in the
NCAA's program. State participation in or support of nominally private
activity is a well recognized basis for a finding of state action."'"
Three months later, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia also found the NCAA to be a state actor in Howard University
v. National CollegiateAthletic Association.45 The court in Howard relied
primarily on the entanglement doctrine to find that "all NCAA actions appear 'impregnated with a governmental character."' 46 In Howard, the university and a student-athlete on the Howard University soccer team sought
injunctive relief from the NCAA sanctions imposed upon the university,
and ultimately the student-athlete, which declared the student-athlete ineligible to participate in intercollegiate events.47
There were several factors which Justice Tamm, writing for the majority, relied upon in finding the extensive entanglement between the state and
the NCAA. First, almost half of the member institutions comprising the
NCAA at the time were state or federally supported, and public institutions
provided most of the NCAA capital.48 Second, state institutions are the
"dominant force in determining NCAA policy and in dictating NCAA ac-

42.
Id. at 1032-33.
43.
Id. at 1033 (The court continues to demonstrate how vast of a governmental
function the NCAA is assuming by stating, "[i]n light of the national (and even international) scope of collegiate athletics .... were the NCAA to disappear tomorrow, government
would soon step in to fill the void.").
44.
Id. at 1032.
45.
510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
46.
Id. at 220 (citing Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966)).
47.
Id. at 214.
48.
Id. at 219.
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tions. ' 49 Third, "all NCAA actions appear 'impregnated with a governmental character."' 50 Fourth, the NCAA provided an "immeasurably valuable service for its member institutions" through its regulation and supervision of intercollegiate athletics. 51 Finding the NCAA to be a state actor
when imposing sanctions, Justice Tamm summed up the entanglement
analysis by stating:
It is undeniable that the NCAA, unlike the state athletic associations, is not the delegated body which is the substituted overseer of one particular state's athletic program...
However, that analysis does not resolve the question of
whether the degree of NCAA regulation of and involvement in those universities' programs and the fact that half
the NCAA's membership [sic] are public institutions sufficiently intertwines their interests and affairs so that the
NCAA is subject to the fifth and fourteenth amendments.52
Because of the inextricable entanglement between Howard University
and the NCAA, the NCAA was found to be a state actor when imposing
sanctions upon the university for violations committed by the studentathletes on the soccer team.
One of the few instances where the NCAA was not held to be a state
actor prior to 1982 was McDonald v. National CollegiateAthletic Association.53 In McDonald, two California State University Long Beach men's
basketball players sued the university and the NCAA for injunctive relief
after being deemed ineligible for violating the 1.600 rule.54 The majority in
McDonald held that in order to find state action, "the state must be so inextricably involved in the 'private' action or must be able to so control the
'private' action that this activity necessarily becomes the functional equivalent of an act of the sovereign." 55 The court ruled that the state or state

49.
Id.
50.
Id. at 220 (citing Evans, 382 U.S. at 299).
51.
Howard, 510 F.2d at 220 (these services include conducting championship
events, determining eligibility and academic standards for student-athletes, and negotiating
television contracts from which member institutions receive monetary benefits).
52.
id. at 219.
53.
370 F.Supp. 625 (C.D. Cal. 1974). See also Dawson, supra note 34, at 232
("During the period when most cases held that the NCAA was a state actor, McDonald v.
National Collegiate Athletic Association stood alone in upholding the NCAA's private

status and avoiding section 1983 liability.").
54. McDonald, 370 F.Supp. at 626.
55. Id. at 630.
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instrumentality in this case was not so inextricably involved with the private action of the NCAA as to dictate a finding of state action. 56 "[I]t is the
concurrence by the state, its instrumentality or sovereign equivalent that is
state action. It is this concurrence then, that must be measured by the requirements of due process and/or equal protection of the law. 57 In finding
the NCAA not to be a state actor, the court relied on the facts that the
NCAA was a voluntary organization 58 and that the NCAA could not impose sanctions upon the student-athletes personally, but only the member
institution. 59
B.

THE BLUM TRILOGY AND THE LIMITATIONS PLACED ON THE STATE

ACTION DOCTRINE

Prior to 1982, federal courts consistently held the NCAA to be a state0
6
actor under either the public function theory or the entanglement doctrine.
When the United States Supreme Court decided the Blum trilogy 61 in 1982,
these three cases, decided on a single day, effectively limited the application of the state action doctrine. Thereafter, federal courts began to hold
the NCAA not to be a state actor under the more limited doctrine.62 While
none of the three cases in the Blum trilogy concerned the NCAA, the Supreme Court limited the acts that would be considered state action through
these holdings.
In Blum v. Yaretsky,63 Medicaid recipients in New York nursing
homes challenged the decisions to discharge or transfer patients to a lower
level of care without notice or recourse to an administrative hearing. 64 The
Court outlined a three-part test that controlled the determination of whether
the actions challenged by the patients could turn the private acts of the
nursing home into state action for purposes of § 1983.

56.
Id. at 631 ("Neither Long Beach-concededly a state instrumentality-nor the
State of California itself can direct the NCAA to conduct itself in any matter at all ...[T]he
NCAA has an existence separate and apart from the educational system of any state.").
57.
Id.

58.
59.

Id.
Id. at 632.

60.
See supra note 32.
61.
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
62.
See, e.g., Dawson, supra note 34, at 233-34; Sahl, supra note 17, at 645; Westover, supra note 37, at 958.
63.
457 U.S. 991 (1982).
64.
Blum, 457 U.S. at 993.
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First, the Court stated that there must be "a sufficiently close nexus
between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that
65
the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.,
Second, a state is responsible for a private decision "only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the
State." 66 And third, "the required nexus may be present if the private entity
has exercised powers that are 'traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the
67
State.',,
In rejecting the respondents' claims, the Court did not find such a
close nexus between the state and the challenged action to treat the action
as that of the state.68 Although the state subsidized ninety percent of the
medical expenses of the patients in the facility, this did not convert the action of the nursing home into state action.69 The Court also concluded that
the nursing home was not performing a function that had been "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state.",70 The day-to-day decisions
made by the nursing home were not the kinds of decisions which had been
traditionally reserved to the state.71
The Supreme Court in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn72 decided that the action
of a publicly-funded, privately-operated school for maladjusted high school
students did not constitute state action when it fired a vocational counselor
and teachers at the school without a due process hearing.73 The Court
compared the school in Rendell-Baker to the nursing home in Blum. 74 Like
the nursing home in Blum, almost all of the funding for the school was "derived from government funding,, 75 so the Court similarly held that the mere
receipt of public funds did not make the decision to fire employees the acts
of the state.76 Furthermore, the Court held that there was no state action in

65.
Id. at 1004.
66.
Id.
Id. at 1005 (citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353
67.
(1974)).
68.
Id. at 1010.
Id. at 1011 ("That programs undertaken by the State result in substantial fund69.
ing of the activities of a private entity is no more persuasive than the fact of regulation of
such an entity in demonstrating that the State is responsible for decisions made by the entity
in the course of its business.").
70.
Blum, 457 U.S. at 1011 (citing Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353).
71.
Id. at 1011-12.

72.
73.

457 U.S. 830 (1982).
Id. at 834-35.

76.

Id.

74.
75.

Id. at 840.
Id.
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firing employees even when the state primarily pays the tuition of the students.7 7
The Court also held, as in the second factor in Blum, that there was no
"coercive power" exercised by the state in firing the employees of the
school. 78 The state merely had the power to approve persons hired as vocational counselors, and this power alone did not make the school's decision
to fire an employee state action. 79 Regarding the third prong in Blum, that
the function is one traditionally reserved to the state, the Court held that the
education of maladjusted high school students is a traditional public function.80 However, simply because the state undertook to provide an education for students who could not be served by traditional public schools, the
acts of the school did not constitute state action. 8' "That a private entity
performs82 a function which serves the public does not make its acts state
action.
83
In the third case of the trilogy, Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Company,
the Court held the acts of Edmondson Oil to constitute state action. 84 Lugar
filed this action alleging Edmondson Oil had acted jointly with the state to
improperly deprive him of his property without due process by securing a
prejudgment writ of attachment against Lugar's property. 85 The Court announced a two-part test to determine the question of "fair attribution" when
deciding whether the conduct causing the deprivation of a federal right is
fairly attributable to the state: first, "the deprivation must be caused by the
exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by it or by a person for whom it is responsible; '86 and second, "the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may
fairly be said to be a state actor. 87 The first prong of the "fair attribution

77.
Id. at 841.
78.
Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 841 ("Here the decisions to discharge the petitioners
were not compelled or even influenced by any state regulation. Indeed, in contrast to the
extensive regulation of the school generally, the various regulators showed relatively little
interest in the school's personnel matters.").
79.
Id. at 841-42.
80.
Id. at 842.
81.
Id.
82.
Id. ("Here the school's fiscal relationship with the State is not different from
that of many contractors performing services for the government. No symbiotic relationship
...exists here."). See also Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724-26
(1961).
83.
457 U.S. 922 (1982).
84.
Id. at 939-42.
85.
Id. at 924.
86.
Id. at 937.
87.
Id.
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test" was satisfied because the prejudgment garnishment of property was
made pursuant to a state statute and thus caused by the exercise of a right
created by the state. 88 The Court held that the second prong of the "fair
attribution test" was also met because the Court had "consistently held that
a private party's joint participation with state officials in the seizure of disputed property is sufficient to characterize that party as a 'state actor' for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment." 89 Therefore, the conduct by
Edmondson Oil in this case constituted state action and was thus subject to
the constraints of the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983.
C.

NCAA AND THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE AFTER

1982

After the Supreme Court decided the Blum trilogy, thus limiting the
state action doctrine, lower federal courts consistently began to hold that
the NCAA was not a state actor. 90 Just two years after the Blum trilogy, the
Fourth Circuit became the first to demonstrate the judicial shift in thinking,
by holding that the NCAA was91not a state actor in Arlosoroff v. National
CollegiateAthletic Association.
In Arlosoroff, a Duke University tennis player sought injunctive relief
against Duke and the NCAA from declaring him ineligible to play tennis
past his freshman year because he participated in organized tennis tournaments and was a member of the Israeli Davis Cup team after his twentieth
birthday.92 The test employed by the Fourth Circuit to find state action was
whether the conduct of the NCAA and Duke University was "fairly attrib-

88.
Id. at 941 ("While private misuse of a state statute does not describe conduct
that can be attributed to the State, the procedural scheme created by the statute obviously is
the product of state action.").
89.
Lugar,457 U.S. at 941.
Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the prohibited action, are acting "under color" of law for purposes of the statute. To act
"under color" of law does not require that the accused be an officer of
the State. It is enough that he is a willful participant in joint activity
with the State or its agents.
Id. (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966)).
90.
See, e.g., McCormack v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th
Cir. 1988); Hawkins v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 652 F.Supp. 602 (C.D. Ill. 1987);
Graham v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 804 F.2d 953 (6th Cir. 1986); McHale v. Cornell
Univ., 620 F.Supp. 67 (N.D.N.Y. 1985); Arolosorff v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 746
F.2d 1019 (4th Cir. 1984).
91.
746 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir. 1984).
92.
Id. at 1020.
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utable to the state. ' 93 The court held that there was insufficient evidence to
show state action by the NCAA. 94
First, the court stated that the NCAA does perform a public function
in overseeing intercollegiate athletics, but this is not a function "traditionally exclusively reserved to the state." 95 Second, while it is true that over
one-half of the member institutions are public institutions providing more
than one-half of the NCAA's revenues, the NCAA is nonetheless a voluntary organization comprised of both public and private institutions.9 6 There
was no evidence to show that public institutions, and not private ones, were
responsible for the adoption of the NCAA bylaw in question in this case.9 7
"It is not enough that an institution is highly regulated and subsidized by a
state. If the state in its regulatory or subsidizing function does not order or
cause the action complained of, and the function is not one traditionally
reserved to the state, there is no state action." 98 Because there was no
showing that the state institutions controlled or directed the NCAA to adopt
the bylaw at issue here, the court concluded the action to be private, instead
of state action. 99
D.
NCAA STATE ACTION COMES TO AN END: NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION V. TARKANIAN

i.

FactualHistory of Tarkanian

The University of Nevada-Las Vegas (UNLV) is a public university
and member institution of the NCAA, which consisted of approximately
960 public and private members at the time the case was brought. 1°° Jerry
Tarkanian had been a head basketball coach for thirty years and had been
the UNLV head coach since 1973.101 After investigating UNLV's basket-

93.
Id. at 1021 (citing Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937).
94.
Id. at 1021.
95.
Id. at 1021 (citing Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352) ("The fact that NCAA's regulatory
function may be of some public service lends no support to the finding of state action, for
the function is not one traditionally reserved to the state.").
96.
Id. at 1021-22.
97. Arlosoroff, 746 F.2d at 1021-22.
98.
Id. at 1022.
99.
Id.
100.
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 183 (1988) [hereinafter Tarkanian].
101.
Id. at 180.
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ball program for two and one-half years, the NCAA COI sent the university
an Official Inquiry on February 25, 1976, outlining seventy-two rules violations allegedly occurring between 1970 and 1976.102 Later, six additional
rules violations were added to the Official Inquiry.10 3 Upon request by the
NCAA, UNLV conducted its own investigation of the alleged rules violations. 1°4 The Nevada State Attorney General's Office conducted the investigation, and UNLV then sent a response to the NCAA stating that it disagreed that the violations occurred.10 5 Along with its response, UNLV also
submitted two boxes of sworn statements, affidavits, and other evidentiary
violations.1 6
materials supporting the reasons for its denial of rules
The COI held hearings over four days to consider the allegations
against UNLV.10 7 The testimony on behalf of the NCAA enforcement staff
consisted of investigators' oral recollection of interviews with sources and
memoranda of the interviews, some of which were compiled after the interview itself. 10 8 The accuracy of the memoranda was unverified by the
interviewees, and with respect to the allegations against Tarkanian, conflicted with the sworn statements and affidavits obtained by the investigations conducted by UNLV itself. 0 9
The COI found thirty-eight rules violations from the seventy-eight initial allegations." 0 In ten of the violations, Tarkanian was specifically implicated." The COI imposed a series of sanctions against UNLV, including a two-year ban on the men's basketball team playing in the postseason
or appearing on television." 2 Following the COI findings, the NCAA directed UNLV to show cause as to why additional penalties should not be
imposed upon the university if Tarkanian3 was not suspended from the
UNLV athletic department for two years.'
UNLV appealed the findings by the COI to the NCAA Council in
May 1977." 4 On August 15, 1977, the NCAA Council affirmed all the

102.
[hereinafter
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Tarkanian v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 741 P.2d 1345, 1346 (Nev. 1987)
Nevada Supreme Court].
Id.
Tarkanian,488 U.S. at 185.
Id.
Nevada Supreme Court, 741 P.2d at 1346.
Tarkanian,488 U.S. at 185.
Nevada Supreme Court, 741 P.2d at 1347.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 186.
Id.
Id.
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findings and penalties imposed by the COI. 15 After the appeal, UNLV
conducted a hearing to determine whether the proposed NCAA sanctions
should be applied to the university.1 16 With respect to the three sanctions,
the university vice president suggested that it had three options: 1) Reject
the sanction requiring dissociation between UNLV and Tarkanian, thus
risking heavier sanctions from the NCAA; 117 2) Recognize UNLV's delegation of power to the NCAA to act as the ultimate arbitrator in these matters, and reassign Tarkanian "although tenured and without adequate notice--even while believing that the NCAA was wrong;"118 or 3) Remove
itself from the NCAA completely because it would not execute the
NCAA's "unjust judgments."' 119 The university president chose the second
12 0
option and informed Tarkanian of the decision.
The day before Tarkanian's suspension was to become effective, he
filed an action in Nevada state court for declaratory and injunctive relief
against UNLV, alleging that UNLV had deprived him of property and liberty without due process in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 1 The trial court
enjoined UNLV from suspending Tarkanian because he had been denied
procedural and substantive due process. 122 The NCAA, not a party to the
initial action by Tarkanian, filed an amicus curiae brief arguing that there
was no actual controversy between Tarkanian and UNLV, and the case
should be dismissed. 23 The NCAA argued that if a controversy existed, it
was a necessary party to the action. 124 The Nevada Supreme Court agreed
with the NCAA, and reversed and remanded the suit to permit joinder of
125
the NCAA.

On remand, and with the NCAA joined as a party to the action, the
trial court reaffirmed the earlier injunction barring UNLV and the NCAA
from imposing the suspension upon Tarkanian. 126 The trial court found the

115.

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.

Id.

Id. at 187.
Tarkanian,488 U.S. at 187.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 188.
Id.
Tarkanian,488 U.S. at 188.
Id.

126. Id. "Additionally, it enjoined the NCAA from conducting 'any further proceedings against the University,' from enforcing its show-cause order, and from taking any other
action against the University that had been recommended in the Confidential Report." Id. at
189 (citation omitted).
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NCAA action to constitute state action, and determined that the decision
capricious. 127
requiring the suspension of Tarkanian was arbitrary and
ii.

The Nevada Supreme Court Holding and Reasoning

The Nevada Supreme Court decided Tarkanian v. NCAA on August
27, 1987, and affirmed the trial court's holding barring UNLV and the
NCAA from suspending Tarkanian.12 8 The NCAA first contended that the
imposition of penalties by UNLV did not constitute state action under §
1983 because the holding in the Blum trilogy limited the state action doctrine.1 29 The Nevada Supreme Court did not agree with the130NCAA's conof cases.
tention, thus declining to follow the Arlosoroff line
The court stated that both Rendell-Baker and Blum stand for the
proposition that state action may be found "if the private entity has exercised powers that are 'traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the
state.' ' 131 The court held that "the right to discipline public employees is
1 32
Since UNLV is a
traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state.
and TarConstitution,
Nevada
public institution existing by virtue of the
kanian is therefore a public employee, state action existed when UNLV and
department.1 33
the NCAA attempted to suspend Tarkanian from the athletic
The court also utilized the two-part test announced in Lugar to find
state action. 134 The first prong was met because "no third party could impose disciplinary sanctions upon a state university employee unless the
135 Therethird party received the right or privilege from the university."
fore, this was a right or privilege created by the state causing the deprivation. 136 The second prong was met because UNLV, a state institution, acted

Id. at 188.
127.
Nevada Supreme Court, 741 P.2d at 1345.
128.
Id. at 1347.
129.
Id. ("The Blum trilogy and cases subsequently interpreting it do not require the
130.
result which the NCAA urges.").
Id. at 1348 (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353
131.
(1974)).
Id.
132.
Id.
133.
Nevada Supreme Court, 741 P.2d at 1349. The two-prong test stated in Lugar
134.
is, first that "the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state or by a person for whom the
State is responsible," and second, that "the party charged with the deprivation must be a
person who may fairly be said to be a state actor." Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
Nevada Supreme Court, 741 P.2d at 1349.
135.
Id.
136.
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jointly with the NCAA by delegating authority to impose sanctions upon
members of its athletic department.13 Holding that the Blum trilogy test to
find state action had been met, the Nevada Supreme Court determined that
the sanctions imposed by the NCAA and UNLV on Tarkanian constituted
state action.
iii. The United States Supreme CourtHolding
On December 12, 1988, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
holding of the Nevada Supreme Court and held that the actions of the
NCAA did not constitute state action and, therefore, the NCAA did not
violate § 1983 by imposing sanctions upon UNLV.138 The Court concluded
by stating that "UNLV has conducted its athletic program under color of
the policies adopted by the NCAA," not those policies which were "devel139
oped and enforced under color of Nevada law."
The Court first stated that the Nevada Supreme Court fundamentally
misconstrued the facts when holding that UNLV delegated its authority
over personnel decisions to the NCAA, thus making them joint actors in
state action.140 The Court reasoned this was not a typical state action case
because Tarkanian was challenging a suspension imposed by UNLV, a
state actor, and not the NCAA, a private party.14 1 "A state university without question is a state actor," and when disciplining a tenured employee,
must comply with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 142 This case is the mirror image of a typical state action case 143
where a private party took "the decisive step that caused the harm to the
plaintiff." 144 But because it was UNLV that actually suspended Tarkanian,
the critical question was not whether UNLV acted jointly with the NCAA,
but whether UNLV's actions in formation of and compliance with the
NCAA rules and recommendations turned the NCAA into a state actor in
145
this case.

137. Id.
138.
Tarkanian,488 U.S. 179 (1988).
139. Id. at 199.
140. Id. at 192.
141.
Id.
142. Id. "Thus when UNLV notified Tarkanian that he was being separated from all
relations with the university's basketball program, it acted under color of state law within
the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Id. at 193.
143. Id. at 192.
144.
145.

Tarkanian,488 U.S. at 192.
Id. at 193.
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The Court then began its analysis of UNLV's role in the NCAA rulemaking. While there is no doubt that UNLV probably had some impact
upon the NCAA rulemaking, the Court held that the university is just one
of several hundred other public and private institutions which had a similar
role. 46 Therefore, the legislation adopted by the NCAA was not Nevada
law, but the legislation adopted by a collective membership for a private
organization, outside of any particular state. 147 Furthermore, UNLV's
adoption of these rules did not create state action because UNLV still retained the authority to withdraw from the NCAA and create its own rules,
or stay a member of the NCAA and try to amend the current rules through
legislative processes.14 8 The Court concluded that neither UNLV's minor
the rules
role in the creation of the NCAA rules, nor its ability to 1adopt
49
NCAA.
the
by
action
state
find
to
once passed, was grounds
Following the analysis of NCAA rulemaking, the Court responded to
the argument by Tarkanian that the NCAA's enforcement proceedings and
subsequent recommendations constituted state action because it resulted
from a delegation of authority from UNLV. 150 This contention was rejected, however, because the Court found that UNLV did not delegate any
power to the NCAA to take specific action against Tarkanian because any
sanction by the NCAA could only be imposed upon UNLV itself, not Tarkanian.' 5 '
Furthermore, the argument that UNLV's duty to cooperate with the
NCAA enforcement proceedings created state action was rejected because
the Court held the NCAA and UNLV to be adversaries, not partners in cooperation. 5 2 "During the several years that the NCAA investigated the
alleged violations, the NCAA and UNLV acted much more like adversaries
than like partners engaged in a dispassionate search for the truth. The
NCAA cannot be regarded as an agent of UNLV for purposes of that pro-

Id.
146.
Id.
147.
Id. at 194-95.
148.
Id. at 195 ("Neither UNLV's decision to adopt the NCAA's standards nor its
149.
minor role in their formulation is a sufficient reason for concluding that the NCAA was
acting under color of Nevada law when it promulgated standards governing athlete recruitment, eligibility, and academic performance.").
Tarkanian,488 U.S. at 195.
150.
Id. at 196. "Contrary to the premise of the Nevada Supreme Court's opinion,
151.
the NCAA did not-indeed, could not--directly discipline Tarkanian or any other state
university employee." Id. at 197.
Id. ("It is quite obvious that UNLV used its best efforts to retain its winning
152.
coach-a goal diametrically opposed to the NCAA's interest in ascertaining the truth of its
investigators' reports.").
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ceeding."' 53 Therefore, the Court held that the NCAA was a ?rivate actor
at odds with the state, not an actor acting jointly with the state.
Lastly, Tarkanian argued that the power and control the NCAA had
over its member institutions was like a monopoly, and UNLV had no
155
choice but to comply with the proposed sanctions ordered by the NCAA.
In rejecting this argument, the Court held that even if the NCAA did have a
monopoly-like control over its member institutions (who are state actors), it
does not necessarily follow that the private organization was acting under
the color of state law. 56 As the Court previously stated, UNLV did not
have to follow the rules of the NCAA.157 It could have withdrawn from the
organization and created its own rules.1 58 "The university's desire to remain a powerhouse among the Nation's college basketball teams is understandable, and nonmembership in the NCAA obviously would thwart that
goal. But that UNLV's options were unpalatable does not mean that they
' 159
were nonexistent."
iv.

The United States Supreme Court Dissenting Opinion

The dissent, led by Justice White, framed the issue in this case as
"whether the NCAA acted jointly with UNLV in suspending Tarkanian
and
thereby also became a state actor."' 16 The dissent argued that this case is
much like the cases of Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. 16 1 and Dennis v.
Sparks,162 in which the Court held private parties to be state actors where
163
the final act was carried out by a state official.
The dissent argued that the NCAA acted jointly with UNLV in suspending Tarkanian and was therefore a state actor.164 First, Tarkanian was
suspended for violating NCAA rules, which were contractually agreed to

153.
Id.
154.
Id.
155.
Id. at 198.
156.
Tarkanian,488 U.S. at 198.
157.
Id. at 194-95.
158.
Id.
159.
Id. at 199 n.19.
160.
Id. at 199 (White, J., dissenting).
161.
398 U.S. 144 (1970).
162.
449 U.S. 24 (1980).
163.
Tarkanian,488 U.S. at 200 (White, J., dissenting). "In both cases we held that
the private parties could be found to be state actors, if they were 'jointly engaged with state
officials in the challenged action."' Id. (White, J., dissenting) (citing Dennis, 449 U.S. at
27-28).
164. Id. at 200 (White, J., dissenting).
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65
Second,
by UNLV, as a requirement of membership in the NCAA.
UNLV and the NCAA agreed that the NCAA would conduct all the hearings concerning this case, and that the COI would make the findings of
fact.' 66 "As a result of this agreement, the NCAA conducted the very hearings the Nevada Supreme Court held to have violated Tarkanian's right to
procedural due process.' 67 Third, UNLV and the NCAA also agreed that
168
In
the findings of fact made by the COI would be binding upon UNLV.
arguing that the NCAA was a state actor, the dissent stated:

In short, it was the NCAA's findings that Tarkanian had
violated NCAA rules, made at NCAA-conducted hearings,
all of which were agreed to by UNLV in its membership
agreement with the NCAA, that resulted in Tarkanian's
suspension by UNLV. On these facts, the NCAA was
'jointly engaged with [UNLV] officials169 in the challenged
action,' and therefore was a state actor.
The dissent then proceeded to attack the conclusions reached by the
majority in this case by drawing comparisons to the holding in Dennis. In
Dennis, a state trial judge enjoined the production of minerals from the
plaintiff's oil leases. 170 The appellate court found that the injunction was
issued illegally and it was dissolved.1 71 The plaintiff, thereafter, brought
suit under §1983 and claimed that the trial judge had conspired with the
corporation seeking the original injunction, thus corruptively issuing the
actor because
injunction.172 The Court held that the corporation was a state
state. 173
the
with
action
joint
the
in
participant
willful
a
was
it
First, the dissent stated that the majority holding-that there was no
state action because the NCAA did not have the authority to directly sancId. at 201 (White, J., dissenting) ("Indeed, NCAA rules provide that NCAA
165.
'enforcement procedures are an essential part of the intercollegiate athletic program of each
member institution."').
Id. (White, J., dissenting).
166.
Id. (White, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
167.
Id. (White, J., dissenting). "By the terms of UNLV's membership in the
168.
NCAA,the NCAA's findings were final and not subject to further review by any other
body, and it was for that reason that UNLV suspended Tarkanian, despite concluding that
many of those findings were wrong." Id. (White, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Tarkanian,488 U.S. at 202 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Dennis, 449 U.S. at
169.
27-28).
170. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 25-26 (1980).
171. Id.at 26.
172. Id. at 25-26.
173. Id.at 31-32.
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tion Tarkanian-was implicitly rejected by the holding in Dennis. 174 The
private actor in Dennis also did not have the power to take action against a
175
third party, and state action was found in that case.
Second, the fact that UNLV could withdraw from the NCAA is similar to the fact that the judge in Dennis could have withdrawn himself from
the agreement to enjoin the production of minerals from oil leases.1 76 "That
he had that option is simply irrelevant to finding that he had entered into an
agreement."' 177 The dissent states that what is critical is that neither UNLV,
nor the trial judge in Dennis, actually withdrew from their respective
8

agreements. 17

Lastly, the fact that the majority held UNLV and the NCAA to be adversaries in the proceedings did not undercut the agreement between the
parties. 179 The crucial fact is that UNLV took the action to suspend Tarkanian.1 80 No state action could be found if UNLV did not actually suspend Tarkanian. 8 1 The parties had a contractual obligation to act jointly
with respect to the investigative and enforcement proceedings, and that
agreement was what created the state action.' 82

v.

The Legislative Response to the Holding in Tarkanian

As a result of the decision in Tarkanian, and the apparent lack of due
process afforded to individuals under NCAA investigation, several state
legislatures passed, or at least introduced, legislation affording due process
protection to these individuals. Four states adopted due process legislation
following the decision in Tarkanian,I8 3 and by 1992, at least six more states
had considered adopting due process legislation in the NCAA.184

174.
Tarkanian,488 U.S. at 202 (White, J.,
dissenting).
175.
Id. (White, J., dissenting) ("But the same was true in Dennis: the private parties
did not have any power to issue an injunction against the plaintiff.").
176.
Id. at 202-03 (White, J., dissenting).
177.
Id. at 203 (White, J., dissenting).
178.
Id. (White, J., dissenting).
179.
Tarkanian,488 U.S. at 203 (White, J., dissenting).
180.
Id. (White, J.,
dissenting).
181.
Id. (White, J.,
dissenting).
182.
Id. (White, J., dissenting).
183.
"Nevada is not the only state that has enacted or could enact legislation that
establishes procedural rules for NCAA enforcement proceedings. Florida, Illinois, and
Nebraska have also adopted due process statutes." Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Miller,
10 F.3d 633, 639 (9th Cir. 1993). See NEv. REV. STAT. § 85-1201 - 1210 (Michie 2002)
(declared unconstitutional for violating the Commerce Clause by Nat'l Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 1993)); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 240.5339-.5349 (West
2002), repealed by 2002 Fla. Laws ch. 2002-387, § 1058; 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. 25/1-13
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The laws passed by the states were aimed at correcting the inadequacies of procedural due process given to the individuals being investigated
by the NCAA. For example, Illinois requires that prior to the evidentiary
hearing, the employee or student who is charged with misconduct must be
notified in writing of the specific date of the hearing, the specific charges
against the individual, and the potential penalties that may be imposed if
the charges are substantiated. 185 All findings in the evidentiary hearing
must be made in writing' 86 and supported by clear and convincing evidence. 187 Any penalty enforced must be based on findings made at a formal hearing before a sanction can be imposed upon any student or employee. 188 Furthermore, the rules of evidence for Illinois civil trials are
applied at the hearings, 189 thus requiring greater scrutiny of the evidence
than what is currently being employed.190 Lastly, in order to ensure maximum procedural and substantive fairness, all findings made pursuant to the
hearing are reviewable in circuit court. 19 1
Even though the statutes passed in Nevada and Florida are no longer
in effect, 192 and NCAA v. Miller implied that the laws passed by other states
193
are also unconstitutional for violating the commerce clause, the fact that
these statutes were passed or even introduced is evidence of the lack of

(West 1998); NEB. REV. STAT. § 85-1201 - 1210 (1999). For a discussion of the statutes
passed by Nebraska and Nevada, see C. Peter Goplerud Il, NCAA Enforcement Process: A
Callfor ProceduralFairness,20 CAP. U. L. REv. 543, 555-58 (1991).
See, e.g., Goplerud, supra note 183, at 555-58. "Legislation has been intro184.
duced in the last two years in California, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Nebraska, Nevada, and
South Carolina." Id. at 555. See also Miller, 10 F.3d at 639 n.7 (the states that have introduced legislation are Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Ohio, and South Carolina.).
110 ILL. COMP. STAT. 25/4(c) (West 1998).
185.
Id. at § 25/4(b) ("Any finding must be made in writing and supported by clear
186.
and convincing evidence.").
187. Id.
Id. at 25/4(a) ("No penalty may be imposed.., on any institution of higher
188.
education.. . , nor shall any collegiate athletic association require or cause any institution of
higher education to impose a penalty on any student or employee, unless the findings upon
which the penalties are based are made at a formal hearing.").
Id. at § 25/4(e).
189.
Id. See also DON YAEGER, UNDUE PRocEss: THE NCAA'S INJUSTICE FOR ALL
190.
(1991) [hereinafter YAEGER]. Yaeger outlines several examples of NCAA investigators'
improper note taking during an investigation, the investigative staff ignoring evidence,
slipshod investigating by the investigative staff, nonexistent standards of evidence during
the hearing, and the presumption of guilt already imposed upon the accused. Id. at 206-14.
110 ILL. COMP. STAT. 25/4(j) (West 1998).
191.
See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
192.
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633, 640 (9th Cir. 1993)
193.
("The serious risk of inconsistent obligations wrought by the extraterritorial effect of the
Statute demonstrates why it constitutes a per se violation of the Commerce Clause.").
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procedural fairness in the NCAA sanctioning processes. In addition, the
statutory provisions which subject any penalty imposed by any athletic
association, college or university to judicial review, show the intent of the
legislatures to ensure that the procedures utilized were fair and, furthermore, that the sanctions were not unduly imposed upon an innocent student-athlete or university employee. 194 Even though subsequent cases and
statutes have undermined the constitutionality of statutes passed by several
state legislatures affording more due process protection to those being investigated by the NCAA,' 95 the validity of the holding in Tarkanian has
also been undermined by the apparent unfairness to those subject to NCAA
investigations.

II.

THE NCAA's STATUS AS A STATE ACTOR WITH REGARD TO THE
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN MEN'S BASKETBALL SANCTIONS

A.
FACTUAL HISTORY AND FINDINGS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT

The controversy regarding possible amateurism and recruiting violations of the University of Michigan (Michigan) men's basketball program
came to a head on February 17, 1996, when five Michigan student-athletes
and one prospective student athlete were involved in an auto accident approximately thirty miles outside Ann Arbor, Michigan. 96 The accident
garnered media attention, particularly with regard to the ownership of the
car involved in the accident197 and the potential involvement of an athletics
representative 198 with the Michigan basketball program. 199

194.

See, e.g.,

(West 1998).

NEB. REV. STAT.

§ 85-1209 (1999); 110

ILL. COMP. STAT.

25/40)

195.
See John Kitchin, The NCAA and Due Process,5 SPG KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
71, 78 (1996) ("Following the Miller and Roberts decisions, most proposed state legislation
of a similar nature has been abandoned. The statutes in Illinois and Nebraska remain intact,
although no efforts have heretofore been made to seek protection under the dictates of those
state laws.").
196.
MICHIGAN REPORT, supra note 2, at § I.
197.
Id. (the car was described as "an expensive late model sport utility vehicle").
198.
While the Michigan Public Infractions Report does not disclose the names of
any parties involved in the scandal, it has been widely reported that the "athletics representative" in question is Ed Martin. "Martin admitted giving a total of $616,000 to four former
Michigan players, including $280,000 to [Chris] Webber." Associated Press, Michigan
Wants Webber to Pay Legal Fees (Sept. 18, 2003), at
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=16183 10&type=story.
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Following the accident, in March 1996, the NCAA enforcement staff
sent a written request to the Michigan athletic director for information regarding the vehicle's owner and the accident. 20 0 After a joint investigation
with the Big Ten Conference, Michigan submitted a report to the NCAA
enforcement staff in June 1996. 201 Michigan later submitted a supplemental report in February 1997, answering further questions posed by the
NCAA enforcement staff.2 °2 Owing to his lack of cooperation with the
investigation of the accident, Ed Martin, the athletics representative accused of providing illegal benefits to the Michigan student-athletes, was
"formally disassociated" from the university in March 1997.203
On March 17, 1997, after further information concerning the potential
violations was uncovered, Michigan's President hired an outside law firm
to initiate an independent investigation into the men's basketball program. 2 0 4 The university submitted the law firm's report to the NCAA on
October 9, 1997,205 and in keeping with the details of the report, Michigan
fired Steve Fisher as its men's basketball coach. 20 6 The NCAA enforcement staff accepted the university's report and determined that there was
insufficient information to find any major violations of NCAA rules.20 7
After a year and a half, in May 1999, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) informed Michigan that the Bureau was investigating improper
payments made to former Michigan men's basketball players by Ed Martin.20 8 Three years later, in May 2002, Martin pled guilty to conspiracy to
launder money in attempts to conceal the source and location of the money
generated from his illegal gambling business. 2°9 As a part of his plea
agreement, Martin agreed to participate and cooperate fully "in any investigation and debriefings conducted by the University of Michigan., 2 10 The
NCAA enforcement staff and Michigan representatives met with Martin,
his attorneys, an FBI agent, and an Assistant United States Attorney in July

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

MICHIGAN REPORT,

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

supra note 2, at § I.

MICHIGAN REPORT, supra note 2, at § I.

See, e.g., id.; Tom Goss, Fisher Out as Michigan's Men's Basketball Coach
206.
(Oct. 11, 1997), at
http://mgoblue.com/document-display.cfm?documentid=11414&seasonid= 198 [hereinafter Goss].
MICHIGAN REPORT, supra note 2, at § I.
207.
Id.
208.
Id.
209.
Id.
210.
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2002 to discuss potential violations committed by Martin as a result of providing money to Michigan men's basketball student-athletes. 21'
The NCAA enforcement staff conducted its inquiry into the potential
violations committed by Michigan in the fall of 2002, and sent a letter of
official inquiry to Michigan on October 25, 2002.212 Michigan responded
to the letter on November 7, 2002 and appeared before the COI on February 14, 2003.213
The COI found that from the spring of 1992 through the spring of
1999, Martin had provided benefits such as jewelry, transportation, cash,
lodging, and meals totaling approximately $616,0002 4 to at least four student-athletes on the Michigan men's basketball team.21 5 In response to
these findings, the COI determined the responsibility which the university
shared for allowing these types of payments to be made:
The university bears significant responsibility for providing "insider status" afforded this representative [Martin] by
its basketball staffs. While the university now disavows
the athletics representative's actions, the fact remains that
former head coach 2 [Fisher] included him in the innermost circle around his teams. The university has fully acknowledged its responsibility and the committee is convinced that these situations no longer exist. However, during the period of time of the violations, the representative
was making payments in staggering amounts to some of
the nation's most prominent men's basketball studentathletes on one of the country's most elite college basketball teams.216
Furthermore, the COI found fault with the student-athletes involved
by stating that they "also share the blame here as they knowingly accepted
large sums of illegally obtained cash in clear violation of their amateur
status. This blatant disregard for NCAA rules has brought great shame to

211.
Id.
212.
Id.
213.
MICHIGAN REPORT, supra note 2, at § I.
214.
Id. at § II.
215.
ESPN.com News Services, Team Will be Eligible for 2004 Tournaments (Oct.
1, 2003), at http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=1623053&type=story ("Martin had
been accused of making illicit cash payments totaling $616,000 to former players Chris
Webber, Maurice Taylor, Louis Bullock and Robert Traylor.").
216.
MICHIGAN REPORT, supra note 2, at § II.
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their university and their own noteworthy athletic achievements as studentathletes. 217
After completion of its own investigation into the illegal benefits
given to student-athletes, Michigan imposed upon itself several penalties
and corrective actions that it desired the NCAA to accept and adopt as the
penalties for this infraction. 218 Included in these self-imposed penalties
were: 1) The men's basketball team was ineligible to compete in the 2003
NCAA Basketball tournament, or the 2003 National Invitation Tournament;219 2) The men's basketball team was forced to forfeit all victories
which the former student-athletes participated in while ineligible; 220 3) All
records and awards for its appearances in the NCAA Basketball tournaments were vacated for the time the ineligible players participated; 221 4)
Ninety percent of the money earned for participation in the NCAA Basketball Tournament while the players were ineligible was returned to the
NCAA; 222 and 5) The university had placed itself on two years' institutional probation. 223
The COI agreed with and adopted the penalties proposed by Michigan; however, the COI imposed several additional penalties for the case it
called "one of the most serious ever to come before the committee. 224
While addressing further penalties to impose, the COI took several mitigating factors into consideration: 1) The university president's "commitment
to accepting responsibility for these violations; 2 25 2) The university's cooperation in the case, including cooperation with federal authorities "to
develop complete information in the case beyond the reach of the NCAA's
investigative abilities; 22 6 and 3) The fact that many of the violations occurred several years before and the involved student-athletes and coaches
227
have since departed the university.

Id.
217.
Id. at § III.A.
218.
Id.
219.
Id. ("This includes the 1992 Final Four competition, the entire 1992-93 season,
220.
and the entire 1995-96 through 1998-99 seasons including postseason play.").
Id. ("This includes NCAA tournament appearances in 1992, 1993, 1996, and
221.
1998 and the 1997 NIT championship.").
MICHIGAN REPORT, supra note 2, at § III.A. (The approximate amount of
222.
money earned for these appearances was $323,810. The total financial penalty self-imposed
was $349,440, which included an additional penalty of $25,630 from future distributions for
these appearances.).
Id.
223.
Id.
224.
MICHIGAN REPORT, supra note 2, at § III.B.
225.
Id.
226.
Id.
227.
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Next, the CO1 discussed the factors that made this case so serious, and
why additional penalties had to be imposed. First, this represented the
largest acknowledged cash payment in the history of NCAA infractions
cases ($616,000).228 Second, the payments were made to "some of the
most prominent men's basketball student-athletes of an era,' ' 229 which led
Michigan to two Final Four appearances in 1992 and 1993 and the NIT
Championship in 1997.230 Third, the actions of Ed Martin, providing benefits to Michigan men's basketball student-athletes, continued through most
of the 1990's, giving Michigan an "ancillary recruiting advantage over
other member institutions.' 23 1 And fourth, the "insider status" into the
Michigan men's basketball '232
program given to Ed Martin "further elevated
the seriousness of the case.
Because of the factors making this case so serious, the NCAA imposed upon the Michigan men's basketball program a list of seven additional penalties. The most detrimental of the additional penalties imposed
were: 1) An additional year's ban on competition in the postseason NCAA
Tournament and National Invitation Tournament,2 33 and 2) The reduction
of one scholarship for the men's basketball team for the years 2004 through
2008.234 Therefore, not only was Michigan burdened with its self-imposed
penalties, which were adopted by the NCAA, but it was also subjected to
the additional penalties imposed by the NCAA itself. The additional penalties imposed by the NCAA were intended to send a message to Michigan of
the seriousness of the violations and a "message235to violators ...via Michigan" not to follow in the university's footsteps.

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id.

235.

Id.
Id.
Id.

MICHIGAN REPORT,

Id.
Id.

supra note 2, at § III.B.

Id. Additional penalties imposed by the NCAA COI included:
1) Michigan was to be publicly reprimanded and censured; 2) Michigan
would be required to show cause why additional penalties should not be
imposed if it does not disassociate itself completely with the studentathletes involved in the scandal for a period of ten years; 3) Michigan
would be required to implement an educational program on NCAA legislation to instruct coaches, student-athletes, and athletics representatives on the responsibility for certification of student-athletes for admission, retention, and financial aid or competition; and 4) After the probationary period, the University president would be required to provide the
COI with a letter affirming that the University's athletics policies conform to NCAA guidelines.
Andy Katz, NCAA Sends Message to Violators .

. .

Via Michigan (May 9,
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B.
THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN'S APPEAL TO THE INFRACTIONS
APPEALS COMMITTEE

After the penalties were issued by the CO on May 8, 2003, Michigan
filed an appeal on May 12, 2003 to the Division I Infractions Appeals
Committee (IAC). 236 Michigan appealed the COI sanction that imposed the
additional one-year ban on postseason competition for 2003-2004 as excessive and inappropriate.23 7 To be set aside on appeal, a penalty imposed by
the COI must be "excessive or inappropriate based on all the evidence and
circumstances., 238 Because NCAA Bylaw 19.5.2.1(f) 23 9 states that a ban
on postseason competition is a presumptive penalty that shall be imposed in
a major infractions case, the IAC found the penalty to be appropriate.24 °
Therefore, the only issue left for the IAC to decide was whether the additional year ban on postseason competition was excessive. 24 1 After reviewing the decision of the COI, the IAC found the ban for an additional year
on postseason competition to be inappropriate and overturned this portion
of the COI ruling.24
The IAC found that Bylaw 19.5.2.1243 does not specify that a multiyear ban is appropriate; therefore, the presumption is that only a single-year
ban is justified.2 The presumption that a single-year ban is appropriate is
strengthened by the fact that since 1985, the COI had imposed one-year

2003), at http://sports.espn.go.coi/espn/print?id=1551123&type=columnist.
236.

REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION DIVISION I

INFRACTIONS

APPEALS

COMMITTEE,

Report No. 208,

Sept.

25,

2003,

available at

http://www.ncaa.org/releases/infractions/2003092501in.pdf [hereinafter MICHIGAN APPEALS
REPORT].

337.

237.
238.
239.

MICHIGAN APPEALS REPORT, supra note 236, at 7-8.
NCAA BYLAW, art. 32.10.2, reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at 447.
NCAA BYLAW, art. 19.5.2.1, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at

240.

MICHIGAN APPEALS REPORT, supra note 236, at 8.

242.

Id. at 11.

241.

Id.

243.
NCAA BYLAW art. 19.5.2.1 regarding presumptive penalties for major violations states:
The presumptive penalty for a major violation, subject to exceptions authorized by the Committee on Infractions on the basis of specifically
stated reasons, shall include all of the following: ... (f) Sanctions precluding postseason competition in the sport, particularly in those cases
in which: (1) Involved individuals remain active in the program; (2) A
significant competitive advantage results from the violation(s); or (3)
The violation(s) reflect a lack of institutional control.
NCAA BYLAW, art. 19.5.2.1, reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at 337.
244.
MICHIGAN APPEALS REPORT, supra note 236, at 8-9.
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postseason bans in 70.6 percent of the cases it had heard.245 Furthermore,
there are generally seven factors which should be evaluated to determine
the appropriate length of a postseason ban 246 and, in cases where a postseason ban was upheld, there existed other factors such as repeat violator
status, lack of institutional control, or academic fraud to justify the postseason ban.247 None of these other factors were present in the case against
Michigan.24 8 Also, none of the factors listed in Bylaw 19.5.2.1 governing
Michigan
the imposition of a postseason ban249 are present in this case.
dissociated itself from Ed Martin, who was the athletics representative involved in the scandal, as part of its self-imposed penalties. 25F The JAC also
disagreed with the COI finding that Michigan had obtained a "staggering
competitive advantage" over other member institutions as a result of the
payments to the involved student-athletes.25 2 The IAC held that in order to
find a significant competitive advantage over other members, there must be
a causal connection between the violation and the competitive advantage.253
There was no evidence of a causal connection in this case because the student-athletes would have attended Michigan and would have competed
even without the improper payments. 4
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the IAC held that the "institution's unique level of cooperation" justified a reduction of the postseason
ban.255 The CO1 commended Michigan on its level of cooperation
throughout the enforcement proceedings, but the IAC held that the COI

Id. at 9.
The general factors to determine the appropriate penalty for a violation include:
(1) the nature, number and seriousness of the violation(s); (2) the conduct and motives of the involved individuals; (3) the corrective actions
taken by the university; (4) a comparison of the penalty or penalties imposed in other cases with similar characteristics; (5) the university's cooperation in the investigation; (6) the impact of penalties on innocent
student-athletes and coaches; and (7) NCAA policies regarding fairness
in and equitable resolution of infractions cases.
See id. at 9 n.3; MississiPpi APPEALS REPORT, supra note 19, at § VI.B.
MICHIGAN APPEALS REPORT, supra note 236, at 9.
247.
Id.
248.
NCAA BYLAW, art. 19.5.2.1, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at
249.
337; see supra note 243 and accompanying text.
MICHIGAN APPEALS REPORT, supra note 236, at 9.
250.
245.
246.

251.

MICHIGAN REPORT, supra note 2, at Appendix 2.

MICHIGAN APPEALS REPORT, supra note 236, at 10.
252.
Id. ("Examples of this would include improper recruiting inducements or aca253.
demic fraud where the student-athlete would not have attended the institution, or would not
have been able to compete, but for the improper assistance derived from the violations.").
Id.
254.
Id.
255.
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"did not accord sufficient weight" to Michigan's level of cooperation in
this case.256 Without the level of cooperation received from Michigan, the
case would never have come to fruition and the identities of the individuals
involved and the amounts of the payments to the student-athletes would
never have been established. 257 "The institution's extraordinary efforts
transcended 'cooperation,' and strongly militate against imposition of a
second year of the postseason ban. 258
C.
WHY THE NCAA SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A STATE ACTOR WITH
REGARD TO THE SANCTIONS IMPOSED UPON THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

As a result of the Supreme Court's holding in Tarkanian, a studentathlete currently has no redress in the courts for the deprivation of a liberty
or property interest.259 However, the University of Michigan studentathletes who have been deprived of the opportunity to play in postseason
tournaments should be able to seek redress in the court system because,
contrary to the holding in Tarkanian, the NCAA should be considered a
state actor with respect to imposing these sanctions upon Michigan. The
NCAA "is a private organization, responsible to no one outside itself, with
powers normally reserved to governments,, 260 and should be viewed as a
state actor when it imposed sanctions upon the University of Michigan basketball program. Holding the NCAA to be a state actor would allow innocent student-athletes, on whom sanctions are improperly imposed, the opportunity to seek redress for a potential deprivation of a liberty or property
interest.
The NCAA should not be considered a state actor for every member
institution in the organization. In most instances, there is little doubt that a
private institution, which can be a member of the NCAA, is not a state actor in and of itself and, therefore, the NCAA cannot and should not be a
state actor with respect to imposing sanctions upon that private institution.
The NCAA, a so-called "private organization, ' '26' imposing sanctions upon
a private university probably could not be characterized as a state actor.262

256.
257.
258.

Id.
Id.

MICHIGAN APPEALS REPORT, supra note 236, at 10.

259.
See Sahl, supra note 17, at 661.
260.
YAEGER, supra note 190, at 6 (quoting former California Representative John
Moss during a congressional investigation of the NCAA's enforcement program).
261.
See generally Sahl, supra note 17, at 624.
262.
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 193 n. 13 ("The situation would, of course, be different
if the membership consisted entirely of institutions located within the same State, many of
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That was not the case, however, with the University of Michigan. Michigan is a public university subject to substantial financial contribution and
control from the state. The University of Michigan is a state actor and
sanctions imposed upon employees or students attending the university by
is
the NCAA should be considered state action because it is conduct that 263
"so entwined with governmental policies" as to become state action.
"State-supported educational institutions and their members and officers
play a substantial, although admittedly not pervasive role in the NCAA's
program... and state participation in or support of nominally private activity is a well recognized basis for finding state action. ' 26 The action of the
NCAA, when imposing sanctions upon student-athletes and coaches,
should be held to be state action because of the pervasive role public institutions, such as the University of Michigan, play in all aspects of the
NCAA.
NCAA rules require member institutions to apply and enforce the legislation governing the organization, and to be subject to NCAA enforcement procedures if the institution fails to fulfill this obligation.265 The University of Michigan adopted these rules as its own in governing its intercollegiate athletics programs, pursuant to the NCAA constitution. "There are
no real alternatives to complying with NCAA policy or directives if an
institution wants to compete in big time college sports. 266 If a university
fails to apply the NCAA legislation, as it is contractually bound to do, it
may be suspended or terminated from participation in the NCAA organization.267 To put it simply, if a university wants to be a member of the
NCAA, it has no choice but to follow the rules promulgated by the NCAA.
Contrary to the holding in Tarkanian, the NCAA is not a voluntary
organization from which members can withdraw if they do not like the way
the organization is run.268 Colleges and universities hoping to maintain an

them public institutions created by the same sovereign.").
263.
Buckton v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 366 F.Supp. 1152, 1156 (D. Mass.
1973) (citation omitted).
Parish v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 506 F.2d 1028, 1032 (5th Cir. 1975).
264.
265.
NCAA CONST., art. 1.3.2, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at 1
("Member institutions shall be obligated to apply and enforce this legislation, and the enforcement procedures of the Association shall be applied to an institution when it fails to
fulfill this obligation.").
Sahl, supra note 17, at 652.
266.
NCAA BYLAW, art. 19.5.3.1, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at
267.
340.
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 198-99 ("The university's desire to remain a power268.
house among the Nation's college basketball teams is understandable, and nonmembership
in the NCAA obviously would thwart that goal. But that UNLV's options were unpalatable
does not mean that they were nonexistent."). See also Tarkanian,488 U.S. 202-03 (White,
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intercollegiate athletics program and, even more, hoping to generate revenue from the athletics programs have but one choice-remain a member of
the NCAA. 26 9 "NCAA membership is not voluntary in any but a technical
definition of the word. The members realize that membership is not truly
voluntary. Most significantly, the NCAA knows it is not. Clearly, the
270
membership understands that, if you want to play, you must belong.
Without membership in the NCAA, universities have little to no chance of
operating a successful intercollegiate athletics program. There is no choice
but to remain a member.
The main reason there is no choice for universities but to remain
members of the NCAA is because of the revenues generated by the NCAA,
mainly through the organization's tournaments. The overall NCAA revenue for 2001-2002 was $357,559,597, which was a 7.8% increase from
2000-2001.271 Of the $357 million, over $273 million came solely from
television rights fees paid by ESPN and CBS.272 To demonstrate the everincreasing revenues generated by the NCAA, the five-year revenue projection, with a 7.4% increase in revenues per year, equals total projected revenue for the NCAA of $562 million in 2006-2007.273 Distributions of
NCAA revenue subsidize and make member institutions' athletics programs possible. In 2001-2002, over $187 million from this revenue was
distributed to Division I member institutions.274 The Big Ten Conference,
with which the University of Michigan is affiliated, received revenue distributions from the NCAA totaling over $17.7 million in 2001-2002.275
Without the distributions from the NCAA, the universities must finance all
the expenses on their own, making it almost impossible to operate any intercollegiate athletics programs, let alone successful ones.

J.,dissenting) ("Indeed, it is true that when considering UNLV's options, the university
hearing officer noted that one of those options was to '[pull] out of the NCAA completely..
. What mattered was not that [UNLV] could have withdrawn, but rather that [the University] did not do so."). See infra notes 271-77 (discussing the financial advantages of being a
member institution of the NCAA).
269.
YAEGER, supra note 190, at 137 ("You don't have an alternative. If you withdraw from the NCAA, you close down your athletic program.") (quoting former University
of Florida president Marshall Criser).
270.
Id. (quoting University of Denver law professor Burton Brody).
271.
2002
NCAA
MEMBERSHIP.
REPORT
4
(2002),
available at
http://www.ncaa.org/library/membership/membershipreport/2002/2002 membership report.pdf [hereinafter MEMBERSHIP REPORT].
272.
Id.
273.
GENERAL INFORMATION BROCHURE, supra note 5, at 39.
274.
MEMBERSHIP REPORT, supra note 271, at 5.
275.
Id. at 6.
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Even with the financial distributions from the NCAA, less than sixtyfive percent of schools with institutional support in Division I-A of the
NCAA reported a net profit in 2001.276 Only thirty-five percent of Division
I-A schools without institutional support reported a net profit. 277 These
numbers indicate the financial infeasibility of operating an intercollegiate
athletics program at all, let alone without being subsidized by the financial
distributions from the NCAA. Without the financial assistance of the
NCAA, intercollegiate athletics programs have little or no chance of survival, making it financially unfeasible for a university wishing to maintain
an intercollegiate athletics program to withdraw altogether from the
NCAA. "The relative power and control of any college in comparison with
that colleges have little choice
the NCAA might well lead to the conclusion
'278
but to bow to the will of the NCAA.
The revenues generated by the NCAA 279 and the distributions of these
revenues to member institutions 280 give the NCAA monopolistic control
over its member institutions, as argued by Tarkanian.28 1 In response, the
Court in Tarkanian found that this did not equal state action because
UNLV could have withdrawn from the NCAA if it chose not to follow the
rules of the NCAA.282 As the Court stated, "that UNLV's options were
unpalatable does not mean that they were nonexistent., 283 The option for
Michigan, or any other NCAA member institution, to withdraw is not only
unpalatable but also impossible if the university has any hope of maintaining a successful intercollegiate athletics program. Non-membership in the
NCAA means not playing in any NCAA-sanctioned events and not even
playing against an NCAA member institution. Non-membership means no
distribution of revenue to offset the exorbitant costs of operating an athletics program. 284 Non-membership means shutting down the athletic department.2 85

276.
Daniel L. Fulks, FinancialTrends and Relationships - 2001, REVENUES AND
EXPENSES OF DIVISION I AND II INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETIC PROGRAMS 16 (2002) [hereinafter REVENUES AND EXPENSES REPORT].

277.
Id.
278.
LeRoy Pernell, A Commentary on Professor Goplerud's Article, "NCAA Enforcement Process: A Call for ProceduralFairness," 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 561 (1991).
See supra notes 271-77.
279.
See supra notes 271-77.
280.
281.
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 198 ("Finally, Tarkanian argues that the power of the
NCAA is so great that the UNLV had no practical alternative to compliance with its demands.").
282.
Id. at 199 n.19.
Id.
283.
284.
See supra notes 271-77.
285.
Sahl, supra note 17, at 623 (Although the view that the NCAA is a voluntary

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

(Vol. 25

Since there is little choice for universities but to remain a part of the
NCAA if they wish to have a successful intercollegiate athletics program,
and since member institutions must follow the constitution and bylaws of
the NCAA, 286 any action taken pursuant to these rules should constitute
state action by the NCAA because of the joint action between the member
institution and the NCAA.287 With respect to the sanctions imposed upon
the University of Michigan, it was the NCAA's finding that Michigan had
violated NCAA rules, made at NCAA-conducted hearings, and agreed to
by Michigan in compliance with its membership agreement with the
NCAA, that resulted in Michigan's ban from postseason basketball competition imposed by Michigan. 288 "On these facts, the NCAA was 'jointly
engaged with [Michigan] officials in the challenged action,' and therefore
was a state actor.''289 Private parties are state actors when they are "willful
participants in joint action with the State or its agents, 290 and in this case,
the NCAA is a willful participant in joint action with the State of Michigan.
The Court in Tarkanian also held there to be no joint action between
UNLV and the NCAA because the "NCAA and UNLV acted much more
like adversaries than partners engaged in a dispassionate search for the
truth."2 9' Since the interests of UNLV and the NCAA did not coincide, the
parties were "antagonists, not joint participants, and the NCAA may not be
deemed a state actor on this ground. 292 However, this is not the case with

organization from which members can freely withdraw is technically correct, "it is inconsistent with the view of most experts that there is no viable alternative to the NCAA for successfully marketing athletic programs.").
286.
See NCAA CONST., art. 1.3.2, reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at 1.
287.
See generally Tarkanian,488 U.S. at 200-01 (White, J., dissenting).
On the facts of the present case, the NCAA acted jointly with UNLV in
suspending Tarkanian. First, Tarkanian was suspended for violations of
NCAA rules, which UNLV embraced in its agreement with the NCAA.
... Second, the NCAA and UNLV also agreed that the NCAA would
conduct the hearings concerning violations of its rules .... Third, the
NCAA and UNLV agreed that the findings of fact made by the NCAA
at the hearings it conducted would be binding on UNLV.
Id. (White, J.,
dissenting).
288.
See, e.g., id. at 202 (White, J., dissenting) ("In short, it was the NCAA's findings that Tarkanian had violated NCAA rules, made at NCAA-conducted hearings, all of
which were agreed to by UNLV in its membership agreement with the NCAA, that resulted
in Tarkanian's suspension by UNLV."). See also NCAA CONST., art. 1.3.2, reprinted in
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at 1 (stating that member institutions must apply and enforce
all legislation in the membership handbook).
289.
Id. (White, J., dissenting) (citing Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980)).
290.
Id. at 200 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Dennis, 449 U.S. at 27).
291.
Id. at 196.
292.
Id.
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respect to the sanctions imposed upon the University of Michigan. The
university and the NCAA were not antagonists, but rather were joint participants. In the Michigan Report, the NCAA COI stated that "[t]he committee also commends the university's cooperation in this case, including
its efforts in conjunction with federal authorities to develop complete information in the case beyond the reach of the NCAA's investigative abilities. '293 The NCAA IAC went even further in commending the cooperation than the COI did, stating: "we believe ... that the Committee on Infractions did not accord sufficient weight to the institution's unique level of
cooperation. In this case, the institution's and NCAA's investigation were
stymied for several years by the investigators' inability to interview any of
the parties directly involved in the violations. 294 The cooperation of
Michigan was the main reason that the IAC reduced the postseason ban
from two years to one year because, without Michigan's cooperation, there
would have been no case at all against the university.29 5
Since there was obvious cooperation and joint participation between
Michigan and the NCAA, the acts of the NCAA should be viewed as state
actions much like the acts of the private restaurant in Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority296 discussed in Tarkanian.297 In Burton, the Court held
that there was joint participation and state action where a private restaurant
and a public parking structure engaged in a lease agreement that resulted in
mutual benefits.298 Due to the interdependence between the private restaurant and the parking structure, the Court held the restaurant and parking
structure to be joint participants in state action when the restaurant discriminated on the basis of race. 299 The Court in Tarkanian rejected this
argument because UNLV and the NCAA were not joint participants, but
adversaries throughout the investigation. 3 00 This argument does not apply
to the case involving Michigan because there was obvious joint participation in the investigation between Michigan and the NCAA. 30 1 Because of
this joint participation in the investigation and enforcement proceedings,
the NCAA and Michigan should be considered joint participants engaging

293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
supra note

MICHIGAN REPORT, supra note 2, at § III.B.
MICHIGAN APPEALS REPORT, supra note 236, at

10.
Id.
365 U.S. 715 (1961).
See Tarkanian,488 U.S. at 196 n.16.
Burton, 365 U.S. at 724.
Id. at 725.
Tarkanian,488 U.S. at 196 n.16.
See MICHIGAN REPORT, supra note 2, at § III.B.; MICHIGAN
236, at 10.
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in state action when imposing sanctions upon the Michigan basketball program.
Holding the NCAA to be a state actor when imposing sanctions upon
member institutions for NCAA rules violations will create the opportunity
for a coach or student-athlete who feels he has been unfairly punished to
seek redress in court for a possible deprivation of a liberty or property interest. Commentators have argued that student-athletes and coaches have
liberty or property interests in competing in games and postseason tournaments. 30 2 Therefore, the opportunity for redress in the court system to
prove the validity of an interest should exist to promote fairness to these
individuals who might have their rights infringed upon by the NCAA. As
it currently stands, there is essentially no recourse in the court system a
student-athlete or coach can take against the NCAA when sanctions are
unfairly imposed upon them.3 °3
III. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE TO THE NCAA SANCTIONING PROCESS
The 2002-2003 University of Michigan men's basketball team was
prevented from participating in the NCAA postseason tournaments in 2003
due to the sanctions imposed by the NCAA for violations which occurred
between 1992 and 1999. 304 With a 17-13 overall record and a tie for third
place in the Big Ten (10-6 record), Michigan would have easily been a
selection to compete for the National Championship through the NCAA
Tournament but for the sanctions prohibiting its participation. 30 5 Further-

302.
See Kevin E. Broyles, NCAA Regulation of IntercollegiateAthletics: Time For
a New Game Plan, 46 ALA. L. REv. 487, 527 (1995) ("The students' interests in protecting
their rights to remain in school (tuition paid) and to remain eligible for athletic competition
are not intangible alone; eligibility may amount to a valuable property entitlement."); Pernell, supra note 278, at 564 (arguing that there might be a contractual relationship between
the student-athlete, university, and NCAA which might lead to recourse in the courts); National Letter of Intent (2003), available at http://www.national-letter.org/ (The National
Letter of Intent is signed by a prospective student-athlete stating his intention to attend a
specific university. The university, at the time of the signing, will indicate the type and
extent of financial aid (scholarship) to be given the student athlete when he attends). But
see, Justice v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 577 F.Supp. 356, 370 (D. Ariz. 1983) (rejecting the student-athletes' contention that the right to participate in a televised or postseason
athletic competition is a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest).
303.
Goplerud, supra note 183, at 554 ("As a result of the Court's decision in Tarkanian, it appears that member institutions, coaches, and student-athletes no longer have
ready access to courts to challenge, on constitutional grounds, actions of the NCAA that
might have caused them injury in some way.").
304.
MICHIGAN REPORT, supra note 2, at § H.
305.
University of Michigan Athletics, 2002-2003 Michigan Men's Basketball Re-
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more, not a single member of the University of Michigan men's basketball
teams from 1992-1999 was still a member of the 2002-2003 Michigan
30 6
men's basketball team-not the players, coaches, or athletic director.
If the student-athletes who committed the violations are still in school,
punish those student-athletes. °7 If the coach who committed the violations
is still an institutional staff member, the coach should be punished.30 8 If the
member institution must be punished, fine the institution for failing to
maintain institutional control. 309 But in no instance should student-athletes
and coaches who had no part in committing the violations be punished for
the violations committed by others.
There is no question that the 2002-2003 Michigan men's basketball
team was being punished by the NCAA for violations that occurred long
before any of the players or coaches on that team were even a part of the
Michigan men's basketball program. While the NCAA states that it punished the university for the violations, 310 the sanctions do directly affect the
current players and the coaches when the sanction involves the loss of eligibility to participate in postseason tournaments. The 2002-2003 Michigan
men's basketball team was prohibited from competing in the 2003 NCAA
Tournament, an honor it rightly deserved, 311 because players and coaches
Michigan program committed NCAA violawho were no longer part of the
31 2
tions while at the university.
suits, at
(last
http://www.mgoblue.com/results.cfm?section-id=233&level=3&top=2&season=30
visited February 7, 2005).
306.
See supra note 3.
See Andy Katz, NCAA's Penalty Phase Has a Few Flaws (May 9, 2003), at
307.
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=1 551150&type=columnist.
308.
See id.
309.
See id.
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 197 ("Contrary to the premise of the Nevada Supreme
310.
Court's opinion, the NCAA did not-indeed, could not-directly discipline Tarkanian or
any other state university employee."). The NCAA only has the power to directly discipline
the member institution, not a coach or player. It is the member institution's obligation to
adopt and uphold the proposed sanctions by the NCAA. NCAA CONST., art. 1.3.2, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1,at 1.
311.
Five Big Ten teams (Indiana, Illinois, Purdue, Michigan State, and Wisconsin)
earned births in the 2003 NCAA Championship Tournament. The University of Michigan
would have been the sixth team from the Big Ten but for the sanctions, with a conference
record equal or greater than that of Purdue, Michigan State, and Indiana. See 2002-2003
Men's Big Ten Standings,at http://www.boilerstation.com/hoops/standings-m.shtml (last
visited Feb. 11, 2005); 2003: NCAA Men's Basketball Tournament- School Rankings,
availableat http://webpages.charter.net/dbwoerner/coaches/schl 103.htm (last visited Feb.
11, 2005).
Dick Vitale, NCAA Gets it Right: Michigan Eligible Again (Sept. 25, 2003), at
312.
http://espn.go.com/dickvitale/v-column030925Michigan-appeal.html ("Michigan got a raw
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The NCAA should reform its enforcement and sanctioning process to
prevent this type of injustice from occurring. Present players should not
have to suffer for violations committed by past players and coaches who
are no longer part of the university. 31 3 "The NCAA purports to recognize
the student-athlete as the center of college athletics, yet the student-athlete
is the most neglected individual in its governance of collegiate sports. 314
The student-athlete does not have a voice in creating or adopting legislation
for the NCAA,3 15 and they are the ones who are ultimately punished if a
violation does occur, even if a current member of the institution did not
commit the violation.
Current coaches such as Bobby Knight,3 16 writers and commentators
such as Dick Vitale, 317 and even state legislatures 318 all call for change to
the NCAA sanctioning process. The goal of these critics is simple-to
provide member institution participants more protection against unfair
sanctions imposed by the NCAA. Without change, the NCAA will continue to impose sanctions upon member institutions with little or no regard
for those student-athletes or coaches who are not responsible for the infractions.

deal with the punishment inflicted by the NCAA's infractions committee last May. It
wasn't fair to penalize current Michigan players for problems that went back a decade or
more to the Fab Five days.").
313.
Id.
I firmly believe this in my heart: Why should any of today's players
have to pay for the improprieties of others? Daniel Horton, Bernard
Robinson Jr., Lester Abram and Co. suffered last year by being kept out
of postseason tournaments. Mistakes made by Chris Webber and Co.
ended up hurting innocent players.
Id.
314.
Broyles, supra note 302, at 530.
315.
Sahl, supra note 17, at 635 ("As a class, student-athletes represent the largest
labor force subject to NCAA regulation. Yet student-athletes do not have any direct representation in the NCAA-the very organization that can deprive them of a meaningful market for their labor.").
316.
Interview by Jesse Ventura with Bob Knight, Head Coach, Texas Tech University Men's Basketball, Jesse Ventura's America (MSNBC television broadcast, Nov. 15,
2003) (Knight, the current Texas Tech University men's basketball coach, stated he would
"throw out the rule book ....
I'd throw out the whole thing and start over again" when
commentating on the current NCAA Manual and enforcement processes).
317.
Dick Vitale, NCAA Gets it Right: Michigan EligibleAgain (Sept. 25, 2003), at
http://espn.go.com/dickvitale/v-column03O925Michigan-appeal.html.
318.
See supra notes 183-91 and accompanying text.
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PUT AN END TO THE BAN ON POSTSEASON COMPETITION

An important consideration in imposing penalties, as stated in the mission statement for the NCAA Enforcement Program, 319 is to "provide fairness to uninvolved student-athletes, coaches, administrators, competitors
and other institutions. '' 320 Among the presumptive penalties for major violations of NCAA rules is a ban on postseason competition when: 1) Involved individuals remain part of the program; 2) A significant competitive
advantage was gained by'the violation; or 3) The violation suggests a lack
of institutional control. 3 21 Furthermore, the NCAA has stated that a mitigating factor in determining whether to reduce an imposed penalty is
whether any current student-athletes or coaches were involved and whether
the penalty will impose a substantial hardship upon them. 322 Unfortunately,
these protections are not enough. The innocent student-athlete should not
be punished at all.
The Supreme Court in Scales v. United States323 stated:
[G]uilt is personal, and when the imposition of punishment
on a status or on conduct can only be justified by reference
to the relationship of that status or conduct to other concededly criminal activity... that relationship must be sufficiently substantial to satisfy the concept of personal guilt
in order to withstand attack under the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment.324
The NCAA is improperly finding guilt on the part of the innocent student-athletes by imposing sanctions upon the 2002-2003 University of
Michigan men's basketball team, when members and coaches of the 19911999 University of Michigan men's basketball teams committed the violations.325 Former Louisiana State University men's basketball head coach

319.
320.
337.

321.

NCAA BYLAW, art. 19.01.1, reprintedin NCAA MANUAL,supra note 1, at 333.
NCAA BYLAW, art. 19.01.1, reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at 333.
NCAA BYLAW, art. 19.5.2.1(f), reprintedin NCAA MANuAL, supra note 1, at

See Infractions Case Appeal: Louisiana State University, NCAA REGISTER,
322.
Mar. 19, 1999 at VII.; Hilliard, supra note 16, at 631.
367 U.S. 203 (1961).
323.
324.
Id. at 224-25.
325.
Justice v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 577 F.Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983)
(This argument was presented by the student-athletes in Justice. The court, however, rejected the argument and found that simply because the student-athletes were innocent of the
wrongdoing that created the imposition of an NCAA sanction, this wrongdoing does not rise
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Dale Brown drew a simple analogy that displays the absurdity of the
NCAA punishing innocent student-athletes for violations they did not
commit: "If I speed, are you going to pay my ticket because I bought the
car from you?"' 3 6 The person who committed the violation should be punished, not those who came after the violation and had no knowledge of the
violation when choosing to attend that particular school-punishing the
innocent for the acts of the guilty goes against the very notion of liberty.
A ban on postseason competition should never be imposed upon a
member institution for major violations when those who committed the
violations are no longer present at the university. All the penalty does is
punish the sons for the sins of their fathers. If the player who committed
the violation is still part of the athletics program, then that player should be
banned from competing.327 If a coach commits a violation, then the coach
should be suspended or have his employment terminated.328 If the studentathletes or coaches who committed the violation are no longer associated
with the athletics program, as was the case with the University of Michigan
men's basketball team, the program should not, however, be free from all
punishment. Ultimately, there is fault with the member institution for the
violation, 329 and the member institution should be sanctioned, but sanctioned without inflicting punishment on the innocent student-athletes and
coaches. Banning competition or postseason participation is an ultimate
punishment 330 and should not be imposed except specifically against those
student-athletes and coaches responsible for the sanction.
A solution to the problem where the member institution needs to be
punished for the violation, but none of the violators are still associated with
the member institution, is with a strict monetary fine instead of preclusion

to the level of a protected liberty or property interest under the substantive Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.).
326.
YAEGER, supra note 190, at 130.
327.
YAEGER, supra note 190, at 130 (quoting former LSU head coach Dale Brown)
("If two people are on the team and they take automobiles, their careers are done."). See
also NCAA BYLAW, 19.5.1(a), reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at 336 (The
NCAA currently does punish student-athletes who commit violations by stripping the student-athlete of eligibility to compete.).
328.
See NCAA BYLAW, 19.5.1(g) & 19.5.2.1(d), reprinted in NCAA MANUAL,
supra note 1, at 336-37. See also YAEGER, supra note 190, at 130 ("If an assistant coach set
it up, he's done. A coach's career should end if he violates a major rule." (quoting former
LSU head coach Dale Brown)).
329.
The university hires the director of athletics, who hires the coaches, who recruits the players. There is fault at the university level whenever a violation occurs because
of this relationship.
330.
NCAA BYLAW, 19.5.2.1 (f),
reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at 337.
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from postseason competition. 33 1 A large fine will prevent future violations
because the university administrators will push the athletics department to
conform to the NCAA rules, the athletics department will push the coaches
to conform to the NCAA rules, and the coaches will push the players to
conform to the NCAA rules.332 The same is true with the sanction precluding postseason competition,333 but the innocent student-athletes and
coaches are not directly affected by a fine, aside from being pushed to conform to NCAA rules. With monetary fines, the member institution is punished for the violation for which it is guilty. Additionally, the studentathletes and coaches who were not participants in the violation would be
allowed to compete in postseason tournaments that they, like Michigan,
earned with their regular and conference season records.
B.

HOLD THE COACHES RESPONSIBLE

The head coach of a university sports team should be held responsible
for any rules violation committed by any person involved with that sports
team during his tenure as head coach. 334 The head coach is responsible for
the actions of assistant coaches and the players both on and off the court or
playing field.335 Essentially, the head coach should be the overseer of all
activities of his players and assistant coaches, and it should be his responsibility to require the players and assistant coaches to conform to NCAA
rules and guidelines.3 36 Therefore, if an NCAA rules violation occurs, the
head coach, as overseer of the players and other coaches, should be sanctioned for failing to maintain control over the program.
It is the duty of the member institution to maintain institutional control, which is "the control and responsibility for the conduct of intercolle-

331.
See NCAA BYLAW, 19.5.2.2(0, reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at
337. See also Andy Katz, NCAA's Penalty Phase Has a Few Flaws (May 9, 2003), at
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=1551150&type=columnist.
332.
See Andy Katz, NCAA's Penalty Phase Has a Few Flaws (May 9, 2003), at
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=1551150&type=columnist.
333.
See NCAA BYLAW, art. 19.5.2. 1(f), reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1,
at 337.
334.
NCAA BYLAW, art. 19.01.4, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at 333
(institutional staff members who violate NCAA regulations are subject to sanctions). See
also infra note 348 and accompanying text.
335.
See, e.g., Goss, supra note 206; MICHIGAN REPORT, supra note 2, at § II. (Steve
Fisher was fired as head coach of the University of Michigan men's basketball team for
NCAA rules violations committed by the student-athletes on the team, but there was no
evidence that Fisher ever committed a rules violation).
336.
See, e.g., supra notes 334-35.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 25

giate athletics. 3 37 Administrative control and faculty control combined
constitute institutional control.338 Therefore, the duties of the director of
athletics and the coaching staff are to maintain institutional control over the
athletics program, and to be responsible for the conduct of others in the
athletics program. 339 The member institution's responsibility to maintain
institutional control extends not only to student-athletes and coaches within
its athletics programs, but also to outside entities who, among others, make
4 were requested to recruit stufinancial contributions to the institution,
dent-athletes by the institution, 34 or are providing benefits to student3341

athletes.342
Since it is the responsibility of the head coach to maintain institutional
control,343 the ultimate responsibility should fall on the head coach when a
violation occurs. At the University of Michigan, Steve Fisher, the men's
basketball head coach during the time the violations occurred, 344 was fired
not because there were specific reports of his involvement in the NCAA
violations, 345 but because the basketball program "was not being held to the
standards [the university administrators] believe[d] all programs at the
University of Michigan should meet." 346 If member institutions do not
appropriately discipline head coaches for failing to maintain institutional
control, unlike the case at the University of Michigan,347 then the NCAA
who
should force the member institution to suspend or dismiss coaches
348
allow constant NCAA rules violations to occur within the program.

337.
NCAA CONST., art. 6.01.1, reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at 49.
338.
NCAA CONST., art. 6.01.1, reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at 49.
339.
See, e.g., id. (administrative control and faculty control constitute institutional
control). See also Goss, supra note 206.
340.
NCAA CONST., art. 6.4.2(b), reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at 51.
341.
NCAA CONST., art. 6.4.2(c), reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at 51.
342.
NCAA CONST., art. 6.4.2(d), reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at 51.
NCAA CONST., art. 6.01.1, reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at 49.
343.
344.
See Goss, supra note 206.
See Andy Katz, NCAA's Penalty Phase Haw a Few Flaws (May 9, 2003), at
345.
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=1551150&type=columnist ("The NCAA Infractions
Committee pointed a finger at former Michigan coach Steve Fisher, but said there was no
direct evidence linking him to the major violations committed within the school's basketball
program during Fisher's tenure.").
Id.
346.
347.
Goss, supranote 206.
348.
"A coach's career should end if he violates a major rule." YAEGER, supra note
190, at 130 (quoting former LSU head coach Dale Brown). In most cases, the member
institution will fire the head coach when it is apparent that he has failed to maintain institutional control. See Goss, supra note 206; ESPN.com News Services, Lucas Sr. Being Considered as Interim Coach (Aug. 8, 2003), at
http://espn.go.com/ncb/news/2003/0808/1592839.html (former Baylor men's basketball
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If the head coach is dismissed for failing to maintain institutional control, the NCAA should also prohibit other member institutions from hiring
that person as its coach. 349 The NCAA is replete with former head coaches
whose improprieties caused them to be fired from a previous coaching job,
but have been hired at another member institution by virtue of their coaching prowess.35 ° Commonly, a coach like former University of Michigan
and current San Diego State University head coach Steve Fisher is rehired
at another institution shortly after being fired from his previous institution.351 While it may be argued that prohibiting another member institution
from hiring a coach would violate a liberty or property interest of the
coach,352 the NCAA would be able to argue, much like it did in Tarkanian,
that it is merely imposing sanctions upon the member institution, not the
coach. Furthermore, since the NCAA is not a state actor, the member insti-

head coach Dave Bliss was forced to resign after many violations including improper financial aid and drug tests); ESPN.com News Services, After Resigning, Harrick Announces
Retirement (March 29, 2003), at http://espn.go.com/ncb/news/2003/0327/1530432.html
(former Georgia men's basketball coach Jim Harrick resigned following alleged academic
fraud in the men's basketball program); Associated Press, Ex-Bonnies Coach Accused of
Ethics Breach (Dec. 10, 2003), at http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/news/story?id=1682516
(former St. Bonaventure men's basketball coach was fired after an NCAA investigation
concerning a player eligibility scandal).
349.
Associated Press, Ex-Bonnies Coach Accused of Ethics Breach (Dec. 10, 2003),
at http://sports.espn.go.corn/ncb/news/story?id=1682516. See also Andy Katz, NCAA's
Penalty
Phase
Has
a
Few
Flaws
(May
9,
2003),
at
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=1551150&type=columnist (former California University head coach Todd Bozeman was banned from coaching in the NCAA for eight years
following rules violations).
350.
See
Steve
Fisher Profile, at
http://goaztecs.ocsn.comsportslmbaskbl/mtt/fisher-steve00.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2005); ESPN.com News Services,
O'Leary
Will
Get
Five
Year
Contract
(Dec.
9,
2003),
at
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncflnews/story?id=1681209 (George O'Leary was hired by the
University of Central Florida as head football coach just two years after Notre Dame fired
him for falsifying his resume); Associated Press, Price Hopes to Rebuild Reputation After
Dismissal (Dec. 23, 2003), at http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=1691469 (Mike
Price was hired as head football coach of the University of Texas-El Paso just seven months
after being fired from the University of Alabama for inappropriate conduct).
351.
See Steve Fisher Profile, available at http://goaztecs.ocsn.com/sports/mbaskbl/mtt/fisher_steve00.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2005) (after being fired from the University of Michigan in 1997, Fisher was hired as head coach of San Diego State University
in 1999).
352.
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 196-99 (Tarkanian also argued he was deprived of a
liberty or property interest when the NCAA forced UNLV to suspend Tarkanian for the
rules violations. Tarkanian lost this argument because the Court held the NCAA not to be a
state actor when imposing sanctions upon UNLV.).
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tutions compliance with the sanctions does not turn the NCAA's act into
state action.
The NCAA does have the power to prohibit a member institution from
hiring a former "institutional staff member" 354 when the staff member
commits unethical conduct. 355 For example, former St. Bonaventure head
coach Jan van Breda Kolff cannot resume coaching at the collegiate level
without the approval of the NCAA as a result of his unethical conduct in an
academic fraud scandal discovered in 2003.356 While the power does reside
with the NCAA to prevent a member institution from hiring a former institutional staff member, this power is not often used because it requires proof
that the coach "knowingly" committed an ethics violation.357 The ability of
the NCAA to prevent a member institution from hiring a former coach who
is guilty of unethical conduct should be extended to any coach who failed
to maintain institutional control, pursuant to NCAA Constitution Article
6.01.1.358 Thus, coaches who fail to maintain a "clean" program would be
sanctioned for the improprieties committed by themselves, their players,
and their staff.359 It is the responsibility of the head coach to maintain institutional control and command his players and coaches to follow NCAA
rules and guidelines. 36 0 By permitting the NCAA to prevent another member institution from hiring a coach who failed his responsibility to maintain

353. Id.
354. NCAA BYLAW, art. 10.1, reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at 53 (For
example, a coach, professor, tutor, teaching assistant, student manager, student trainer).
355. NCAA BYLAW, art. 10.1, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1,at 53
(unethical conduct includes, but is not limited to: a) Refusal to cooperate with an NCAA
investigation; b) Knowing involvement in academic fraud; c) Knowing involvement in
offering prospective or current student athletes improper inducements; d) Knowing furnishing the NCAA false information with regards to an NCAA violation; or e) Receipt of benefits by an institutional staff member for arranging a meeting between the student-athlete and
an agent).
356. Associated Press, Ex-Bonnies Coach Accused of Ethics Breach (Dec. 10, 2003),
at http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/news/story?id=1682516. See also Andy Katz, NCAA 's
2003),
at
9,
(May
Few
Flaws
a
Has
Phase
Penalty
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=1551150&type=columnist (former California University head coach Todd Bozeman was banned from coaching in the NCAA for eight years
following rules violations). But see supra notes 350-51 and accompanying text.
See NCAA BYLAW, art. 10.1, reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at 53.
357.
358.
See NCAA CONST., art. 6.01.1, reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at
49.
359.
See id.; NCAA BYLAW, art. 10.1, reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at
53.
360. See NCAA CONST, art. 6.01.1, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at
49. See, e.g., Goss, supra note 206 (firing Steve Fisher as men's basketball head coach at
the University of Michigan for, in part, failing to maintain institutional control).
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institutional control, the responsible coach is sanctioned for his failure to
maintain control.
C.

IMPOSE A STRICTER STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

The sanctions imposed upon the University of Michigan did not take
effect until 2003, while the violations were committed from 1991_1999.36 1
Therefore, the innocent student-athletes at Michigan in 2003 were left to
pay for violations which occurred as many as twelve years earlier. "Because NCAA investigations can drag on for years, when the penalties are
finally handed down, most of the coaches and players responsible for the
violations are gone, leaving the current heirs of the program to pay for past
transgressions. 362 In the case of Michigan, all the coaches and all the
players who committed the violations had long since left the program, leaving new student-athletes and new coaches behind to pay for their viola36 3
tions.

"In general" there currently is a four-year statute of limitations concerning alleged violations that may be processed by the NCAA enforcement staff.3
However, as the Michigan case illustrates, this statute of
limitations is not strictly enforced and violations which occurred long before the investigation began are being processed.3 65 Moreover, investigations by the NCAA can drag on for years. 366 These factors lead to innocent
student-athletes and coaches being punished for merely attending a university where past violations were committed by those no longer part of the
member institution. "You measure injustice not by the guilty who are punished, but by the innocent who are victimized. 36 7 A stricter statute of limitations and a quicker enforcement process will lead to less injustice to those
innocent student-athletes and coaches who did not commit the violations
being sanctioned.

361.
See MICHIGAN REPORT, supra note 2, at § I.
362.
Broyles, supra note 302, at 544.
363.
See supra note 3.
364.
Frequently Asked Questions About the NCAA Enforcement Process (last visited
Feb. 12, 2005), at http://www.ncaa.org/enforcement/faq-enforcement.htm-.
365.
See MICHIGAN REPORT, supra note 2, at § I.
366.

Broyles, supra note 302, at 544. See also MICHIGAN REPORT, supra note 2, at §

I. (The enforcement staff first made a written request to the Michigan athletics director in
March 1996 for potential violations and the penalties were not handed down until May
2003).
367.
YAEGER, supra note 190, at 196 (quoting USA Today writer Mike Lopresti).
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CONCLUSION

The NCAA enforcement process is a flawed system that unfairly punishes innocent student-athletes and coaches for the indiscretions and violations of past student-athletes and coaches. While judicial intervention is
unlikely given the Supreme Court holding in Tarkanian, several arguments
can still be made that the NCAA is a state actor when imposing sanctions
upon member institutions, especially in a case like the University of Michigan, where a public university acted jointly with the NCAA in imposing
sanctions. The innocent student-athletes and coaches at Michigan who
were unfairly sanctioned by the NCAA should be able to seek redress in the
court system to argue the deprivation of a liberty or property interest
through the state action of the NCAA.
Even if state action is not found, the NCAA and its member institutions must internally address the problems involving the sanctioning process. Merely stating that an important consideration in the sanctioning process is the potential unfairness to innocent student-athletes is not enough
368
The student-athletes
protection for those who committed no violations.
and coaches who did not commit the violations deserve more protection
than mere lip service paid to such unfairness in the NCAA bylaws. Real
protection, such as imposing a penalty against the member institution
which does not in turn penalize innocent student-athletes, needs to be provided. Without real protection, innocent student-athletes and coaches will
continue to be unfairly punished for the indiscretions of past participants,
while the guilty parties walk away with impunity. While the Michigan
men's basketball teams of the early 1990's will be remembered as some of
the greatest college basketball teams of that time (they even participated in
the National Championship Game in 1992),369 the 2002-2003 University of
Michigan Men's Basketball team was not given this opportunity because of
the sanctions imposed by the NCAA. 370 The NCAA denied the 2002-2003
team its chance to achieve greatness because student-athletes who had long
since left the program committed violations, and administrators and
coaches who had long since left the program failed to maintain institutional
control.37 ' While the NCAA bylaws state that an "important consideration"
in imposing penalties is fairness to uninvolved student-athletes and

368.
369.
370.
ments).
371.

NCAA BYLAw, art. 19.01.1, reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at 333.
MICHIGAN REPORT, supra note 2, at § II.A.
Id. at § Ill.A. (2002-2003 team was barred from playing in postseason tournaId. at § I.A.
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coaches, 372 fairness to the 2002-2003 University of Michigan men's basketball team was definitely
not a factor.
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NCAA BYLAW, art. 19.01.1, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at 333.
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